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A.J. Hobbins and Daniel Boyer* Seeking Historical Truth: the
International Commission of
Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine
in Ukraine
In the 1980s the WCFU (World Congress of Free Ukrainians) undertook many
initiatives to "educate" Western public opinion on the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-
33, claiming that the famine was a Soviet act of genocide against the Ukrainian
people. The WCFU sponsored an international commission of enquiry, com-
posed of seven eminent international jurists, and appeared before the commis-
sion as plaintiff. The Commission dealt with a number of controversial issues in
international law, including the question of whether the charge of genocide could
predate the 1948 convention. The Commission deliberations are examined in
detail, frequently with the use of unpublished sources from the archives of one of
the commissioners, John Peters Humphrey. The Final Report (1990) lacked
unanimity and created very sharp divisions among the Commission's members.
Lors des ann6es 80, le WCFU (World Congress of Free Ukrainians) a entrepris
plusieursprojets afin de conscientiserl'opinion publique intemationale concernant
la famine en Ukraine des ann6es 1932-33 en soutenant que cette famine 6tait un
acte de g~nocide perp6tr6 par I'URSS contre le peuple ukrainien. Le WCFU a
commandit6 une commission internationale d'enqu~te constitute de sept 6minents
juristes internationaux. Le WCFU s'est par la suite pr6sent6 devant la commis-
sion comme requdrant. La Commission s'est pench6e sur toute une gamme de
questions en droit international dont celle-ci: puisque le crime de genocide a 6t6
d6fini et interdit par la convention de 1948 est-il possible de juger sur cette base
des 6venements ant6rieurs a la Convention ? Les d6lib~rations de la Commis-
sion sont examinees en dMtail souvent a partir de sources in6dites d'un des
commissaires, John Peters Humphrey. Le rapport final de 1990 montre de
profondes divisions entre les diff6rents membres de la Commission.
* A.J. Hobbins is Associate Director of Libraries, McGill University, and literary executor of
John Peters Humphrey. Daniel Boyer is the Wainwright Civil Law Librarian, Nahum Gelber
Law Library, McGill University. The authors would like to thank a number of people for help
received in preparing this article. Professors Jacob Sundberg and Joe Verhoeven, President and
Vice-President respectively of the International Commission, kindly answered a number of
questions via email, giving their perspective of the events. Professor Sundberg was also good
enough to send a number of background articles and documents. Various Ukrainian organiza-
tions helped out on clarifications of fact, including Andrij Makuch, Roman Senkus and
Wsevolod Isajiw of the University of Toronto, and Alexandra Szubelak of the Ukrainian World
Congress. Professors Mary Ann Glendon (Harvard Law School) and Warren Dicks (Universitat
Aut6noma de Barcelona) read and made invaluable comments on various drafts of this
manuscript. However, despite this kind assistance, it should not be inferred that any of those
who have helped the authors agree with the conclusions found herein.
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I. The Ukrainian Famine
1. The Diaspora
When the Ukrainian Republic declared its sovereignty1 on July 16, 1990,
there were approximately four million Ukrainians and their descendants
living abroad. This diaspora2 took place at the turn of the century and in
the aftermath of the two World Wars. The first wave of Ukrainians left
Galicia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the late 19th
century and some came later from Russia as a result of Tsarist persecution
and the troubles of 1905. The second wave left after the Bolshevik victory
in the Russian Civil War and the collapse of the independent Ukrainian
republic, which had enjoyed only a brief and unstable existence, in 1921.3
1. Full independence was not declared until August 24, 1991, subject to ratification by a
referendum scheduled for December 1, 1991.
2. The Ukrainian dmigr6 community uses the term diaspora to refer to the dispersal of ethnic
Ukrainians, and this is how it is used in this article. Traditionally this word is used to describe
the dispersal of the Jewish people from the Babylonian Captivity to the present day. The fact
that many Jews, living in the Ukraine, left at the same times as the ethnic Ukrainians, and for
similar reasons, adds to the confusion. However, Jews and Ukrainians had often been
opponents in the old country and had little to do with each other in the new. The use of terms
such as diaspora, genocide and holocaust to describe the ethnic Ukrainian experience is
undoubtedly a conscious effort to convey to the outside world the concept that they too were
victims of gross human rights violations. It should be noted that while the Oxford English
Dictionary, s.v. diaspora, online: Oxford University Press <http://www.oed.com> defines
Diaspora as referring only to the Jewish dispersal, American dictionaries now allow the more
general usage.
3. The Central Rada (Council) of the Ukraine unilaterally declared independence on Novem-
ber 20 1917, the same day as the Bolshevik coup in Moscow. The Bolsheviks recognized the
independent Ukraine on December 3, 1917. Within a month, however, there were two
Ukrainian governments - Nationalist Ukraine, centered on Kiev, and Soviet Ukraine, based at
Kharkov. The independent republic was restored in November 1918, following the collapse of
Germany. Lenin withdrew recognition of the republic in February 1919 and the government
was forced to remove itself from Kiev. The White Russian offensive in the summer of 1919
restored the republic once more. The Red Army invaded a third time in the spring of 1920 and
within a year the Ukraine had been subjugated. See R. Yakemtchouk, L'Ukraine en Droit
International (Louvain: Centre Ukrainien d'Etudes en Belgique, 1954) at 9-15; See also R.
Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press in Association with the
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986) at 25-42 [hereinafter Harvest of Sorrow].
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The situation of the people was exacerbated by the major famine of 1920-
1921. Between the wars, the Ukrainian people were subjected to a number
of Soviet policies aimed at denationalism and dekulakization. Stalin
attempted to curb and eliminate the nationalistic tendencies of the many
non-ethnic Russian peoples who made up the Soviet Union. In the
Ukraine the Kulaks (or Kurkuis in Ukrainian) were a class of well-to-do
peasants who owned their own land. Beginning in 1931 many of these
Kulaks were deported to create the necessary climate for the collectiviza-
tion of farms. The Ukraine, the granary of the Soviet Union, was also
subject to grain quotas that were used for redistribution elsewhere in the
country, for storage for military purposes, or for export. The population
of the Ukraine was subjected to a second famine in 1932-1933. When the
Germans invaded in 1941 many of the people welcomed them as
liberators and joined the fight against the Soviet Union. When the tide of
battle turned, these people retreated with the German army and became
refugees at the close of the war. The refugees formed the third wave of the
diaspora, settling in many countries, with the majority in the United
States and Canada.
2. The Famine
For many years little was known of the famine of 1932-1933. Unlike the
famine of 1920-1921, when Lenin had requested and received humani-
tarian foreign aid to help the people, the Soviet Union continued to export
grain during the period. The Soviet government denied the existence of
a famine and the western press gave conflicting reports. Many of the
famine reports were dismissed, with some justification, as Nazi anti-
Soviet propaganda. At this time nations were introspective, attempting in
various ways to overcome their own internal hardships created by the
Great Depression. Awareness of the famine was lost in the tide of greater
events that culminated in the Second World War. Yet the Ukrainian
6migr6s never forgot the famine and the millions of their countrymen who
died as a result. Tarred to some extent as wartime collaborators with the
Nazis,4 they perceived some justification in that alliance because of
4. In 1986 the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals (the Desch~nes Commission) found
that there were alleged Ukrainian war criminals living in Canada. Jews and Ukrainians living
in the Ukraine and in exile have a long history of antagonism and quite different views of the
Second World War in which both groups see themselves as victims. Jews accuse Ukrainians
of helping the Nazis with the final solution, while Ukrainians accuse Jews of spearheading the
Bolshevik programs of denationalism and dekulakization that resulted in the 1932-33 famine.
For example, Lazar Kaganovich, by 1990 the sole surviving Soviet official from the famine
period accused by the Ukrainians of genocide, was a Ukrainian-born Stalinist of Jewish origin.
For an excellent dispassionate analysis of these troubled times, see H. Troper & M. Weinfeld,
Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Markham,
Ont.: Penguin Books, 1988).
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Soviet repression.' Specifically, they considered the famine as a deliber-
ate act of genocide by Stalin against their people.
II. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians
In 1967 delegates representing over two hundred Ukrainian organiza-
tions in twenty countries met to form the umbrella organization, the
World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU). 6 The WCFU was a
nationalist anti-Soviet organization, committed to publicizing the
Ukraine's culture and recent history. By the 1980s the WCFU was
involved in a number of initiatives in this regard either directly, through
its subsidiaries, or through lobbying efforts and financial support. Monu-
ments were erected, the documentary film Harvest of Despair7 was
sponsored, attempts were made to get the famine included in school
curricula, the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University created
the Famine Project in 1981 resulting in a number of scholarly publica-
tions,' and the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Ukraine Famine 9
was established. At the fourth World Congress in 1983 the WCFU,
believing the evidence of "famine-genocide" was incontrovertible, took
its boldest step, determining to create an international tribunal to inves-
tigate the famine. A Commission on Famine Genocide in Ukraine was
established under the Executive Directorship of Simon Kalbal° to orga-
5. Many ethnic Ukrainians welcomed the invading German army as liberators in 1941 and
some joined Ukrainian 14th Waffen SS Galizien Division. Conversely Jews living in the
Ukraine preferred Soviet domination, where repression was general and not specifically
directed at them. Troper, supra note 4 at 13ff.
6. The name was changed to the Ukrainian World Congress at the VI Congress, 1993,
following the emergence of an independent Ukraine.
7. S. Nowytski & Y. Luhovy, Prod. and Dir. Harvest of Despair (Toronto: Ukrainian Famine
Research Committee, 1984) [hereinafter Harvest of Despair].
8. The Institute sponsored such books as Harvest of Sorrow, supra note 3; 0. Woropay, The
Ninth Circle: In Commemoration of the Victims of the Famine of 1933, ed. by J.E. Mace
(Cambridge: Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1983); as well as articles such as E.
Mace, "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine" (1984) 33 Problems in Communism 37.
9. The US Congress created this Commission in 1984. Its duties, enumerated in the Bill
establishing the Commission, H.R. 4459 & S. 2456 (1984) included the mandate to "provide
the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the Soviet
role in the Famine" and to "study and analyze the reaction by the countries of the world to such
famine." The Commission's findings documented the tragedy as well as the diverse reactions
of western journalists who were present, from cynical cover-up (Walter Duranty, New York
Times) to searing denunciation (Malcom Muggeridge, Manchester Guardian). Following its
Report to Congress, President Bush legislated funding to enable the Commission to pursue its
work. In 1990 the three-volume Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933 : Oral
History Project of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, ed. by J.E Mace & L. Herezt
(Washington : U.S.G.P.O. 1990) concluded the Commission's work. While the Commission
provided useful materials for historians, its detractors suggest that its creation was a political
manceuvre of the Reagan era State Department in its cold war policy.
10. Simon (or Semen) Kalba (1911-1996) handled all the details connected with the
International Commission for the WCFU.
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nize this tribunal. This article will examine the work of the International
Tribunal, or Commission of Inquiry as it became formally known, based
largely on the papers of one of the Commissioners, John Peters
Humphrey,1 with a view to evaluating the effectiveness of this process
of inquiry.
III. International Commission of Criminal Inquiry
1. The Draft Statute for an International Commission
There had been previous attempts to establish international commis-
sions; 2 however, they had generally lacked credibility. In an attempt to
overcome the inevitable credibility gap, the WCFU, in consultation with
its counsel, decided to base the tribunal, which became known as the
International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine,
on the draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry.
This legal instrument had been conceived and written by the International
Law Association and was finalized during the ILA's 1982 Montreal
11. John Peters Humphrey (1905-1995) donated all of his papers to the McGill University
Archives with the instruction they were to be made available to scholars. McGill University
Archives (MUA) arranges its accessions by Record (RG) or Manuscript (MG), Container
number and File number. The Humphrey papers devoted to the International Commission are
to be found in MUA MG4127, Cont. 17, Files 354-361 [hereinafter MG4127].
12. Historical tragedies, believed to be rooted in Communist ideology, have spawned various
elaborate commissions of inquiry, set up in diverse ways to serve many ends, as illustrated
below:
In 1924, Prince Orloff sponsored the publication in Paris of a book by N. Sokoloff, Enquete
judiciaire sur l'assassinat de lafamille lmpdriale Russe avec les preuves, les interrogatoires,
les ddpositions des tdmoins et des accusds et 5 plans et 83 photographies documentaires
inddites (Paris: Payot, 1924). Sokoloff was ajuge d'instruction of the Omsk tribunal who was
personally mandated in February 1919 by Admiral Kolchak to investigate the July 1918 murder
of the Russian royal family in Ekaterienburg.
In 1940, the Spanish government established the Causa General or "Mass Lawsuit" and
ratified it by the decree of June 19, 1943. The Causa was constituted to "prove to the world
at large and to History, with a maximum of seriousness and security, the guilt of the Popular
Front", because "the Communist Party, controlled from outside Spain, was in reality the
arbitrator of the Popular Front policy." The General Cause, The Red Domination in Spain
(Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, 1946) at 8.
In 1943, the German government sent or invited three delegations to the Katyn forest in Russia
to investigate the mass murder of Polish officers which had taken place there. The first
delegation was composed of German nationals and included medical doctors and jurists. The
second was the Internationalen Kommission Gerichtsmedizinscher Sachverstaniger Von
Europaischen Universitaten, an "International Commission" composed of representatives sent
by various forensic medicine departments of Universities located either in Axis states,
occupied countries, or Switzerland. It was composed of twelve doctors who concluded that the
mass murder of Polish officers took place around 1940. The third delegation, assembled under
the auspices of the Red Cross, was composed of Polish medical experts. See J. Mackiewicz,
Katyn -ungesiinhntes Verbrechen (Zurich: Thomas Verlag, 1948).
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conference. 13 In Montreal, the ILA formally requested that the Statute be
forwarded to the United Nations for submission to the Economic and
Social Council as well as member states of the UN.
Professor Jacob Sundberg, who would become president of the Com-
mission on the Ukraine famine, was present at the Montreal meeting and
spoke on the draft Statute. He dismissed the Nuremberg Charter as an
example of "victors' justice" and opposed, as unmanageable, the inclu-
sion of the Anti-Apartheid Convention in the list of offences that the
Statute would investigate. Furthermore, the report on the Montreal
conference stressed that the "... most important principle with respect to
the choice of the offences must be the rules of nullum crimen sine lege and
nullapoena sine lege."'4 This principle would entail the exclusion of all
offences that under the conventions were not explicitly declared to be
punishable. Under the Statute, no act would be punishable unless defined
as an offence by a convention in force. The UN "outlawed" genocide 15
years after the Ukrainian famine took place. Therefore, by Sundberg's
definition, the Commission investigating the famine would not be able to
make a finding of legal genocide barring some new and potentially
problematic reinterpretation of the rule. Professor Georges Levasseur,
another future member of the Commission, translated the draft Statute
into French.
The draft Statute may have been selected as a model for the future
Commission because it included offences defined in the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Although the
Statute was designed to be implemented by States, calling for a perma-
nent seat in Vienna paid for by contracting states, etc.,15 it provided a
functional structure for the one-time investigation of complex historical
events. By addressing fundamental problems, the Commission adum-
brated the international criminal law developments of the late 20th and
early 21' century.
13. International Law Association, "Draft Statute for an International Commission of
Criminal Inquiry" in Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal 1982 (London: International
Law Association, 1983) at 424-439 [hereinafter ILA].
14. Ibid. at 448. These Latin aphorisms amount to the same juridical concept (no punishment
unless a law has been broken) and were used by the defense at the Nuremberg War Crimes
Tribunal.
15. Ibid. Art. 12 at 427.
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2. Establishment of Commission
a. Commissioners
The draft Statute called for members of the Commission to be "jurists
of repute".'6 It took the WCFU several years to prepare for the Commis-
sion and it was not until 1987 that Sundberg, Levasseur and J.Y.
Dautricourt (Belgium) were approached to be members. Sundberg told
Kalba, when he was approached, that he considered the Commission "a
nice invitation to suicide."' 7 Nonetheless, he agreed to serve on the
Commission because the work represented "a well-financed effort to
break a taboo, tabooing being one of the more depressing phenomena"
that he had met in Sweden. Sundberg was in many ways a natural choice.
A well-known academic lawyer from a traditionally neutral country,
Sundberg had taught jurisprudence and air law at the University of
Stockholm and was associated with the Institute of Public and Interna-
tional Law, Stockholm. He pioneered the field of human rights advocacy
in Scandinavia, and had argued a number of important cases before the
European Court of Human Rights. Sundberg was perhaps an attractive
choice for the WCFU because he was a long-term critic of Sweden's
socialist establishment and he had published articles critical of Marxism
in relation to the law. In particular, he had suggested that Marxist regimes
inevitably used genocide to eliminate the bourgeois class since the
bourgeoisie cannot be reformed.' 8 These opinions, however, could, and
ultimately did, lead to difficulties for Sundberg and, by extension, the
Commission. Dautricourt also held views that might have appealed to the
WCFU. He had previously expressed the opinion that for a regime to deny
food, amongst other necessities, to a group, could be considered an act of
genocide. 9 Commission member Levasseur had retired after a long
career at the universities of Lille and Paris, but continued to be an active
researcher. At this time he was heavily involved in drafting the new
French Penal Code. The Commission's three members met in April 1987
16. Ibid. Art. 4 at 426.
17. Letter from Sundberg to Hobbins (15 March 2001).
18. See J. Sundberg, "On Marxism as a Legal Practice" (1987) 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 823 at 829
[hereinafter "Marxism"].
19. Experience provides that a state of war or a military operations regime gives
authorities a convenient pretext not to provide a population or a group with what they
need to subsist - food, medicines, clothing, housing... It will be argued that this is
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.
J.Y. Dautricourt, "La prdvention du genocide et ses fondements juridiques" (1969) 14:15
Etudes internationales de psycho-sociologie criminelle 22 at 22-23 as cited in U.N. Doc., 4 July
1978, E/CN.4/Sub.2/415 at 27.
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to complete some preliminary business, which included developing a list
of other prospective Commissioners. Sundberg was appointed Acting
President until the full Commission was convened.
The WCFU recommended the names of potential Commissioners to
Sundberg, who was also asked to make suggestions. Unaware of the
antagonism between Ukrainians and Jews, he somewhat naively pro-
posed the name of a Jewishjurist.20 Kalba submitted a number of WCFU-
approved c.v.'s to Sundberg, most of whom Sundberg did not know.
However, Sundberg had no objection if: "... [t]hey were willing to join
this 'suicide mission' provided he was satisfied with their general
standing.21
Dautricourt died not long after the April 1987 meeting, and his
compatriot Marc Bossuyt was proposed to stand in his place. Bossuyt
declined, recommending Joe Verhoeven who duly joined the Comnis-
sion.2 2 Verhoeven had been a member of a Commission that investigated
the 1915 massacres of Armenians. The remaining members of the
Commission were appointed over the next few months. Those members
were: Colonel G.I.A.D. (Gerald) Draper, British professor of interna-
tional law at the University of Sussex and former war crimes prosecutor;
John Peters Humphrey, Canadian professor of international law at
McGill University and former Director of the UN Division of Human
Rights; Ricardo Levene, Argentinean professor of penal law and crimi-
nology, as well as comparative criminal law at the Universities of Buenos
Aires and La Plata; and Covey Oliver, American professor emeritus of
international law at the University of Pennsylvania, and former Ambas-
sador and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The
Commission was created on February 14, 1988, and Sundberg was
confirmed as President. These individuals represented, by and large, a
most distinguished Commission and appeared to fill the criterion of
"jurists of repute."
Despite the evident eminence of thejurists, one might ask whether they
were selected because of views they had expressed that the Petitioner
might find attractive - for example, those of Sundberg and Dautricourt
listed above. Such a question is extremely difficult to answer. Humphrey,
like Verhoeven, was a second choice as a Commissioner, accepting the
20. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17. Sundberg asked British Law Commissioner Aubrey
Diamond, who declined. Later, discussing this with Kalba, he ruefully noted: "I soon
understood that it was not a good suggestion". Diamond was the only suggestion that Sundberg
made.
21. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
22. Email from Verhoeven to Hobbins (13 March 2001). Bossuyt had just been named to the
UN Human Rights Commission, which he chaired in 1988.
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role after Ronald St. John Macdonald had declined owing to his appoint-
ment as a judge on the European Court of Human Rights. 23 There were
several possible reasons why Humphrey's views might have appeared to
make him a natural choice. In his autobiography,24 Humphrey noted that,
in his final year at the UN, his relationship with the Russian delegation
was extremely poor" and this might have led the Petitioner to the
erroneous conclusion that Humphrey was anti-Soviet. Perhaps more
importantly, Humphrey was of the view that the Genocide Convention
had a declarative as well as a constitutive character. Such a declarative
character might allow for the conclusion that the illegality of what came
to be called genocide pre-existed the Convention, an interpretation of
which the WCFU certainly would have approved. Humphrey had also
advocated compensation for the individual victims of human rights
violations.2 6 An examination of the careers and scholarship of the other
Commissioners might unearth potential reasons they were selected.27
However, whatever the predisposition of Humphrey or any other Com-
missioner and whatever the reason any of them were selected, it cannot
be concluded solely on this basis that their views would affect their
impartiality as Commissioners.
Sundberg regularly mentioned to his fellow Commissioners, as he had
done to Kalba, that serving on the Commission was an "invitation to
suicide." Interpretations of these remarks highlighted a divergence of
23. Macdonald notes that, although he had often accepted responsibilities after Humphrey
had declined them through pressure of other activities, this was the only occasion in which the
roles were reversed. Conversation with Hobbins (January 2001).
24. J.P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: a Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994).
25. The Soviet delegations voted against Humphrey's election to the Subcommission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, and even prevented him from
receiving a vote of thanks in the Human Rights Commission for his twenty years service as
Director of the UN Division of Human Rights. This problem with the Soviet delegations was
in connection with Humphrey's activities to create the position of a UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights. See A.J. Hobbins, "Humphrey and the High Commissioner: the Genesis of
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights" (2001) 3 Journal of the History
of International Law 38. On the other hand, although it was not generally known, Humphrey
had always been a socialist and quite antagonistic toward right-wing political views. Ironically,
several of Humphrey's friends and acquaintances had been alleged to be Soviet agents. See A.J.
Hobbins, "Humphrey and the Old Revolution: Human Rights in the Age of Mistrust" (1995)
8 Fontanus 121.
26. See for example, J.P. Humphrey, Speech at Conference on the Right to Compensation,
Ottawa (30 May 1989) in MG 41271181364.
27. Verhoeven could think of no reason why he might have been chosen other than Bossuyt's
recommendation. Verhoeven, supra note 22. Initially he thought it might have been because
he had been a member of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal of the Lelio Basso International
Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, but later understood that had this been
known it might have disqualified him, at least in the minds of some Commission members, as
"a dangerous leftist".
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thinking between him and the others. Those living in small countries
bordering the Soviet Union have a different perspective from those, in
Sundberg's words, living in "faraway, well-armed and well-protected
NATO countries. '2 When he spoke of "suicide" and the integrity of the
Commission, he was being literal. 29 He felt the Commission work might
provoke a vicious Soviet response, possibly with a fatal outcome. He
knew that the recent mysterious violent deaths of people in elevated
positions in his country - the arms export inspector, Admiral Algernon,
his faculty colleague, Professor Hilding Eek and Prime Minister Olof
Palme - were believed to have something to do with covert foreign
activity, presumably linked to Soviet activity.3" The other jurists most
probably thought Sundberg was referring to character, not actual, assas-
sination, since there would be a likelihood of attacks on the reputations
and credentials of the Commissioners. Verhoeven recalls:
Sundberg mentioned many times his so-called suicide [fears], but he
appeared to be mostly concerned with his academic profile. At least, that
was at that time my interpretation, even if during the London session he
seemed to be aiming at physical security as well.
That said, he was always concerned with 'security'. For instance, he told
me to ask for a special police protection, during the Brussels session.
Which I did. But no special protection was given. And the session proved
to be quite safe and pleasant. No soviet agents were seen!3'
It is clear that Sundberg's fears, whether justified or not, were very real.
The Commissioners may have had various motives for agreeing to serve
on the Commission. Such service clearly called for a certain amount of
moral courage, but for Sundberg, physical courage was also required.
b. Mandate
The origin of the mandate of the Commission is to be found in the Terms
of Reference3 2 proposed by the WCFU counsel, Canadian barrister John
Sopinka. The Preamble of the terms stated inter alia:
Whereas there is contention as to the weight of evidence that the famine
was deliberately planned and carried out by the Soviet Russian govern-
ment and members of the party in power at the time, and was an instance
of the use of mass starvation as an instrument of genocide.
28. Email from Sundberg to Hobbins (18 March 2001).
29. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
30. Letter from Sundberg to Hobbins (24 April 2001); email, supra note 28.
31. Email from Verhoeven to Hobbins (15 March 2001). Sundberg remembers that there
were armed guards at the Brussels session; Sundberg letter, supra note 30. Verhoeven recalls
these as private security guards, although he still feels any possible interest by the Soviet Union
in the Commission was greatly over-estimated. Email from Verhoeven to Hobbins (II May
2001).
32. Terms of Reference of the Commission (January 1988) cited in MG4127/17/354.
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This was followed by a statement of the purpose of the Commission,
which was to inquire into and report on:
1. the existance [sic] and extent of the famine;
2. the cause or causes of such famine;
3. the effect it had on Ukraine and its people;
4. the recommendations as to individual andlor group responsibilities
for the famine. 3
The Commission34 accepted the purpose statement, but reduced the
Preamble to stating: "Whereas there is contention as to the evidence that
there was a deliberately planned famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33. ''31
Sundberg informed Kalba that at this preliminary meeting it "was agreed
that the decision to expugn [sic] reference to the Genocide Convention
from the Terms of Reference should be supported and maintained. 3 6
c. Financing the Commission
Since the costs of the action were to be borne by the WCFU as petitioner,
a number of issues relating to potential conflict of interest arose. For this
reason, a trust fund to cover the Commission's expenses based "on
voluntary donations, collected world wide," was established by the
Congress. The trust fund was controlled by a Finance Committee consist-
ing of: Sundberg, as Commission President; Ian Hunter as Commission
General Counsel; and Dennis Morris, a Toronto lawyer, whose firm acted
as trustee.37 Bearing the cost of an International Commission entails
considerable financial resources. The preliminary budget for the first
(Brussels) session of the Commission was $118,000.00, excluding study
33. Ibid.
34. In the persons of Sundberg, Draper and Verhoeven (13 January 1988). The full
Commission did not meet until the following month in Toronto.
35. International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine, The Final
Report, 1990 (Toronto: 1990) [hereinafter Final Report].Terms of Reference. Exhibit D.
unpaged. The FinalReport is a composite of anumberof separately paged or unpaged sections
as follows: Introductory Chapter (10 p.); Terms of Reference, Exhibit D (1 p.); Rules of
Procedure, Exhibit E (3 p.); The History of the International Commission of Inquiry and Its
Mandate (5 p.); The Majority Opinion (61 p.); Dissenting Opinion by Professor Georges
Levasseur (5 p.); Separate Statement by Professor Covey T. Oliver (2 p.); Separate Opinion of
President, Professor Jacob Sundberg (88 p.); and Separate Statement of Professor Ricardo
Levene (hijo) (21 p.). Sundberg subsequently reissued the Final Report as Stockholm Institute
of Public and International Law. Juristfdrlaget, no. 109, 1996, with the addition of an index,
some additional material and a somewhat altered text. While the reissue is a much easier
document to use, it should be treated with some caution because of the changes. For this reason
all subsequent references to the Final Report in this article refer to the original edition.
36. Letter from Sundberg to Kalba (19 January 1988) in MG4127/17/358.
37. Final Report, supra note 35 at 2-3.
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grants to the Commissioners totaling $17,500.00.18 In addition to the
Commissioners, the witnesses, experts, General Counsel and Commis-
sion personnel all received accommodation, including meals, transporta-
tion and a per diem.
The Final Report simply noted, in regard to fees for the Commission-
ers, that "[I1n order to maintain the integrity of the Commission as an
independent body, the Commissioners agreed to serve without remunera-
tion."3 9 This position was apparently elaborated at the Organization
Meeting held in Toronto on February 12 -14, 1988, as follows:
[I]t was established that the Commissioners should receive no fees from
the Petitioner since such payment might compromise the integrity of the
Commission. Instead it was agreed that the Commissioners should receive
aper diem to meet expenses in the abstract and in an amount corresponding
to that received by international judges. Theper diem was thereupon fixed
equivalent to what was received by the judges of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal (198 1).0
While the attempts to maintain an arm's-length relationship with the
Petitioner may appear laudable, there is actually little wrong with paying
a fee to the jurists from whom some dedication was expected over three
years. They could scarcely be expected to work pro bono. Sundberg
acknowledged that his categorical opposition to receiving a fee was
actually based on his "Swedish high tax society background. '41 He
preferred arrangements, such as per diems, which were not subject to
taxation. The agreed reimbursements were in fact quite generous. When
Humphrey was invited to join the Commission, Kalba wrote to him
stating:
As far as expenses are concerned, basically our Congress pays the
transportation and hotel accommodation for the commission members and
their wives, and covers the cost of working luncheons in addition to a per-
diem reimbursement at the U.N. rates, as well as a study grant of U.S.
$2,500 advanced before each of the projected three sessions.4 2
The accommodation allowance included the costs of meals. The allow-
ance for other expenses was fixed at US $200.00 per diem, although the
Commissioners evidently spent longer in the city than the actual hearings.
In regard to the five-day New York session, Kalba wrote to the Commis-
sioners:
38. Preliminary Budget for Two-weeks Brussels Session (4 May 1988) in MG4127/17/357.
39. Final Report, supra note 35, Introductory Chapter at 1.
40. J. Sundberg, "History of the International Commission of Inquiry and its Mandate," Draft
(29 October 1989) at I in MG4127/17/354. This report is far more detailed than the document
derived from it bearing the same title in the Final Report, supra note 35.
41. Sundberg, supra note 17.
42. Letter from Kalba to Humphrey (17 September 1987) in MG4127/17/357.
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Following our agreement established in Brussels, please find enclosed an
advance check for U.S. $1,000.00, paid on behalf of the Commission to
every member on account of per-diem, with the understanding that the
balance of $600.00 will be received in New York as cash payment.43
Thus the Commissioners received an eight-day allowance to cover five
days of hearings. The Final Report is quite silent on the question of the
study grant of $2,500.00 per session. Humphrey certainly received his
initial study grant in November 1987 for the Brussels session to be held
the following May. 44 Sundberg cannot recall receiving any study grant.45
He considered it possible that Kalba might have offered the study grants
to others as part of his recruitment process. Verhoeven does not remem-
ber receiving any further grant after the Brussels session.46 It is probable
that the initial study grant of $2,500.00 was paid to the Commissioners,
but the subsequent ones were declined after discussion at the Brussels
session. While the remuneration seems quite reasonable given the work
involved, it would have been wiser for specific details about remunera-
tion to be included in the Final Report.
d. General Counsel
The position of General Counsel, as envisioned by the ILA draft statute,47
was created "in order to bring balance to the hearings and add to the
integrity of the Commission.48 Sundberg defined the role of the General
Counsel as follows:
The General Counsel was intended to counterbalance the presence of the
Petitioner and its Counsel, thereby giving the proceedings adversarial
rather than inquisitorial character. The General Counsel is thus to some
extent an opposing party as well as an amicus curiae and, as a result, very
much an officer sui generis. He is supposed to present to the Commission,
with complete impartiality and independence, his reasoned submissions.
He is to be heard before the Commission gives a ruling on any dispute
about, or objection to the proceedings before the Commission.49
43. Memorandum from Kalba to all Member-Commissioners (29 September 1988) in
MG4127/17/355. One thousand dollars was given as an advance a month before the session.
44. Letter from Kalba to Humphrey (4 November 1987) in MG4127/17/357.
45. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
46. Verhoeven, supra note 22. It should also be noted here that Verhoeven refused to accept
any remuneration for the preparation of the Final Report, supra note 35, accepting only
reimbursement of the cost of typing and translation.
47. ILA, supra note 13, Art. 22. Sundberg states that the hybrid figure of General Counsel was
sketched on the model of the European Commission of Human Rights. Sundberg letter, supra
note 30.
48. Final Report, supra note 35, Introductory Chapter, at 2.
49. Sundberg, supra note 40 at 2-3.
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The General Counsel was a paid office. At its meeting of February 14,
1988, Professor Ian A. Hunter of the University of Western Ontario Law
School 0 was retained as General Counsel at Humphrey's suggestion.5
This might have been viewed as a questionable choice in terms of the
requisite "complete impartiality" because Hunter was an unabashed
admirer of Malcolm Muggeridge, who was one of the Petitioner's key
eye-witnesses. Indeed, eight years previously, Hunter had written a
laudatory biography of the journalist in which he reached certain conclu-
sions as to the existence and nature of the famine based on Muggeridge' s
observations. 2 However, the Commissioners saw little difficulty in this
relationship when Humphrey informed them of the biography.53 Indeed,
Sundberg considered it "a blessing that [Hunter] had such a good
command of the matter that he could carry out the cross-examinations, as
he did - in an excellent way."54 Verhoeven thought little about it since,
at that time, he had not heard of Muggeridge.
55
e. Secretariat
Sundberg proposed that the Commission have a separate Secretariat hired
at the Petitioner's expense, including the offices of Press Officer, Docu-
mentation Officer, Legal Secretary and Finance Officer.5 6 It was his
intention, in order to distance the Commission from the Petitioner, that he
select the Legal Secretary or Clerk, and that that officer hire the other
members of the Secretariat. 7 However, the Petitioner effectively hired
the staff and the loyalties of staff members were not always clear. The
Legal Secretary was Adrian Jenkala, a British barrister of Ukrainian
extraction, while the Documentation Officer was Stephen Werbowyj,
also of Ukrainian heritage and now a Toronto-based immigration lawyer.
Kalba contracted out the publicity work to the Pittsburgh, PA, public
relations firm of Creamer, Dickson, Basford. Their account executive,
Sonya H. Darragh, served as Press Officer for the Commission. Sundberg
had stressed that "ultimate control of the extent and method of media
50. Hunter has since taken early retirement and now writes political, religious and legal
commentary from a conservative perspective.
51. Verhoeven, supra note 22. Humphrey knew Hunter professionally and had invited him
to speak at the Canadian Human Rights Foundation summer school in Charlottetown, P.E.I.
52. I.A. Hunter, Malcolm Muggeridge: A Life (Toronto: Totem Books, 1980) at 76-91. So
great was Hunter's admiration for Muggeridge that he recognized the danger of himself
becoming a hagiographer at 9.
53. Verhoeven, supra note 22.
54. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
55. Verhoeven, supra note 22.
56. Letter from Sundberg to Kalba (19 January 1988) in MG4127/17/357.
57. Draft Terms of Reference for the Position of Clerk to the Commission in MG4127/17/354.
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coverage should be in the discretion of the Commission."58 At the
Brussels session, however, Jenkala requested, "the Commissioners have
no direct contact with the Press in order to forestall any major attack on
the credibility of the Commission."5 9 It is unclear why cutting off the
Commissioners from the press would avoid questions of credibility.
Indeed, since Kalba's Commission on Famine Genocide in the Ukraine
also had a Press Officer, Tricia Flinn, her press releases were often
confused for official Commission releases. This confusion caused the
Commission to come under attack at the New York session and thus
created a credibility question despite Sundberg's best efforts.
f. Audi Alteram Partem
One obvious problem facing the Commission from its inception, even if
it was accepted as an independent body, was the question of how it would
hear evidence from all parties. As the Petitioner, the WCFU would
present all the evidence supporting its contention that the famine was man
made and an act of genocide, but there were clearly differing views on this
question. The use of a General Counsel alone could not fill this void.
Sundberg also felt the Commission would be "crippled" without access
to the documents in Soviet archives.60 Humphrey recognized the problem
of Soviet representation immediately and wrote to Kalba on December 4
1987:
I think it is especially important, from the point of view of credibility, that
we have some representation from the Soviet Union, if possible, and am
wondering whether some attempt to further this end, perhaps through
diplomatic channels, could be made in addition to the formal notice. Have
you considered the possibility of inviting a Soviet jurist to join the
Commission?6
Humphrey's question about having a Soviet Commissioner was never
answered and one imagines that, if such a thought had ever occurred to
the Petitioner, it was quickly discarded as being worse than Sundberg's
suggestion of a Jewish Commissioner. Sundberg, commenting on this
question recently, stated: "The idea of having a Soviet Commissioner
with us was an extremely dangerous idea, since such a member was likely
to be able to, and indeed to sabotage the whole exercise. ' 62 Sundberg's
perspective on Soviet participation tended to be different from his fellow
Commissioners, partly because of the differences in age and partly
58. Sundberg to Kalba, supra note 56.
59. Memorandum from Jenkala to the Members of the Commission (Undated circa 22 May
1988) in MG4127/17/354.
60. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
61. Letter from Humphrey to Kalba (4 December 1987) in MG4127/17/358.
62. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
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because of Sundberg' s more exposed academic position. He summarized
the disagreement over inviting a Soviet jurist as follows:
Consequently, I was abit more aloof to ideas and suggestions coming from
my colleagues at the Commission than perhaps they realized. John
Humphrey was a profile in himself. He was an old professor on the
American pattern, recruited more for his achievements than for his
scholarly writings. He was used to putting questions and looking sceptic,
but not to do much practical work. I think his attitude to a Soviet
participation is typical. He spotted the drawbacks of not having any Soviet
participation, but he did not want to discuss the matter seriously with me
(e.g. by putting together a pro and con memo) because that would require
more work than he thought it merited in his case.
63
Draper certainly agreed with Humphrey's point of view, writing to him:
I do not see why some evidence might not be heard from Soviet jurists and
other specialists, if that is the wish of the Commission. Indeed, this might be
helpful because the Commission is concerned with Soviet law and adminis-
tration governing the agriculture of the U.S.S.R. during the relevant years. 64
Oliver, who was of a like mind to Humphrey regarding inclusion of Soviet
representatives, was asked to draft a more formal invitation and noted that
it was "designed to encourage Soviet participation, rather than to induce
rejection out of hand. '65 In addition to the Soviet Union, the invitation
was addressed to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics. Oliver's
draft stated:
In the interests of complete impartiality and fairness, the present Commis-
sioners earnestly solicit the selection of a colleague from soviet circles to
join them; and, in any event, the full participation as counsel of the
representative or representatives of any group or groups from within the
Soviet Union is invited in relationship to the evidence-taking stages of the
Commission's work, detailed above.
Humphrey enthusiastically supported Oliver's draft, writing:
Thank you for sending me a copy of Professor Oliver's draft of the
invitation to be sent to the Soviet Union. He has done a very good job. I
think however that it might be better if we were to delay the request for
access to documents until after the Soviets have appointed their Commis-
sioner - if, of course, they do.
63. Email from Sundberg to Hobbins (22 March 2001) Sundberg's assessment of the amount
of work Humphrey would be willing to put in on Commission activity was probably fair. By
this time Humphrey was an octogenarian and in the twilight of his career. For example,
Commission documentation reported that "Prof. Humphrey regretted that for time reasons he
would not be in a position to submit any scholarly paper on the genocide matter." Sundberg,
infra note 89 at 5.
64. Letter from Draper to Humphrey (30 April 1989) in MG4127/17/357. Draper was
replying to Humphrey's letter of April 24, 1989 indicating Humphrey was still trying to get
Soviet involvement.
65. Letter from Oliver to Kalba (13 January 1988) in MG4127/17/358.
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I also think that, as Professor Oliver suggests, the invitation should be sent
to the heads of government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics all of which are members of the
United Nations.66
Sundberg's view on the issue seemed somewhat more cynical. He felt
there was no chance of a positive Soviet response and he was more
concerned with the public relations perspectives. He wrote to Kalba:
We were particularly concerned with the integrity of the Commission and
the details of the types of assistance required by it and the Officers of the
Commission to be appointed for that purpose.
At the start we considered that it would be necessary to invite in carefully
framed terms a representative of the U.S.S.R. to participate in the work of
the Commission if the U.S.S.R. wished so to act. In particular it was
thought that the invitation should extend in terms to enable the Soviets to
contribute to the proceedings of the Commission in a positive manner and
it would be of particular value if the Soviets could furnish evidence relating
to the subject of the Commission's inquiry. We paid particular attention to
the framing of this invitation, fully aware that the response will probably
be negative. In our view the integrity of the Commission demands such an
invitation so framed and it should be published in the Final Report of the
Commission as part of its transactions. 61
Kalba took Oliver's draft and redrafted it "in co-operation with Messrs.
W.G. Danyliw and John Sopinka". 68 He sent the new draft to Sundberg,
stating, "all the basic paragraphs from Prof. Oliver's draft are in-
cluded. '69 Yet Kalba's draft was addressed only to Nikolai Ryzhkov,
Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., and did not invite the participation of a
Soviet Commissioner. Access to the Soviet archives was requested and
the hope that a Soviet Representative could attend the sessions of the
Commissions was expressed. Interestingly, this draft defined the Com-
mission in the following terms:
Composed of jtrists of international repute, the Commission of Inquiry
will act principally as a fact-finding body, within a legal framework that
will exclude retroactive application to its fact-finding task of legal doc-
trines and parameters that did not evolve until later times. Its fact-finding
work will include, of necessity, inquiries into the motives and intentions
of certain persons in authority; but it will not trespass upon fundamental
politico-legal principles related to the sovereignty and independence of
states.70
66. Letter from Humphrey to Kalba (19 January 1988) in MG4127/17/356.
67. Sundberg to Kalba, supra note 56.
68. Letter from Kalba to Sundberg (21 January 1988) in MG4127/17/358.
69. Ibid.
70. Draft of January 22, 1988 in MG4127/17/358.
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Sundberg retained this paragraph in his official invitation changing only
the last sentence to conclude: "... persons in authority at the time in
question, without interfering with the sovereignty and independence of
states."'" He further reduced the invitation for a Soviet Representative to
simply stating the "Commissioners invite Soviet attendance in the
evidence-taking stages of the Commission's work. 7 2 He also omitted,
perhaps wisely as they were subject to change, the dates and places of the
sessions.
Humphrey was not pleased when he received a copy of this letter. It
seemed to him to move far away from Oliver's intention of encouraging
participation, veering towards "inducing rejection." It contained no
mention of a Sovietjuristjoining the Commission. Humphrey also found
some of the additions troublesome. Writing to Kalba, he stated:
I was surprised on reading it to see on the second page the statement to the
effect that the Commission would act 'within a framework that will
exclude retroactive application to its fact finding task of any legal doc-
trines and parameters that did not evolve until later times'. I do not know
who was responsible for this: it must have been put in during my absence.
But it raises some questions. Does it mean, for example, that because the
U.N. Genocide Convention came into force only in the fifties whereas the
famine was in the thirties, the Commission will be precluded from finding
that genocide occurred? Perhaps you will remember the discussion that
took place when it was decided to include the statement in the letter.
73
Humphrey received no written reply to his inquiry doubtless because the
changes had taken place after the Commission's discussion of the letter.
It is apparent, however, that Sundberg' s letter clearly informed the Soviet
premier that the Commission would not answer the question of whether
genocide had occurred. Humphrey felt the Commission should be free to
reach such a conclusion should the evidence warrant it. The Final Report
noted that Sundberg's letter "was not heeded except to the extent that the
USSR Embassy in Ottawa contributed a few letters with references to
present scholarship in the USSR."74 Given the tenor and lack of specific-
ity of Sundberg's letter it is not surprising there was no official response
from the Soviet Union. Sundberg also decided against submitting a
71. Letter from Sundberg to Ryzhkof (13 February 1988) in MG4127/17/354. In the
interpretation of this phrase, Sundberg stated: "Anybody familiar with Soviet ways will
immediately understand how the Soviets would read such an empty treacherous phrase as 'it
will not trespass upon fundamental politico-legal principles related to the sovereignty and
independence of states.' To them, the phrae meant exactly the opposite to what it purported
to say." Sundberg letter, supra note 30. Olbviously such nuances presented difficulties to more
straightforward minds like Humphrey. I
72. Ibid.
73. Letter from Humphrey to Kalba (10 March 1988) in MG4127/17/356.
74. Final Report, supra note 35 at 2.
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second invitation to Ryzhkov for the New York session because of
financial difficulties." In short, the invitation appeared to be made not to
elicit a response, but rather to allow the Final Report to state that the
Soviet Union declined to cooperate. Sundberg felt the situation was a
difficult one and his letter was the best that he could have done in the
circumstances.76 Later in this article the actual responses of public and
private individuals in the Soviet Union will be discussed.
g. Petitioner's Counsel
As noted above, the WCFU had selected as its Counsel, John Sopinka,
Q.C., then a senior partner at the Toronto firm of Stikeman, Elliot.
Sopinka, of Ukrainian ancestry, was a distinguished barrister and legal
educator, who had represented the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee in
front of the Deschfnes Commission." He prepared the case for the
Brussels hearing and made the opening statement. On May 24, 1988, the
day following the beginning of the hearing, he was elevated to the
Supreme Court of Canada and thus resigned from the case. Alexandra
Chyczij, a young Ukrainian-Canadian lawyer who had been helping
Sopinka, continued the case. What Chyczij lacked in experience she
made up for in conviction, presenting her case by all accounts with
passion and eloquence. However, with Sopinka' s resignation, the WCFU
began the search for another high-profile counsel. In September, William
Liber, Q.C., of the Toronto law firm Gardiner, Roberts, was retained to
continue the case.
3. The Brussels Hearing
The first evidence-taking session of the Commission was held in Brussels
May 23-27, 1988. The Commission dealt with a great mass of documen-
tation supplied by Sopinka, and heard the evidence of eyewitnesses, as
well as expert witnesses, including Robert Conquest and James Mace.
Conquest, a Senior Research Fellow of Stanford University and de-
scribed perhaps hyperbolically by the Petitioner as "probably the most
learned scholar in Soviet government and history in the western world,"78
had recently published a lengthy and unquestionably scholarly work on
the famine.7 9 While Conquest's work is considered reputable, he also had
critics. The more strident of these critics pointed to his wartime back-
75. Letter from Sundberg to Kalba (9 October 19M5) in MG4127/17/359. For further details
of the financial difficulties, see Section 111.4, infra.
76. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
77. Supra note 4.
78. This description is taken from Petitioner's Counsel William Liber's Opening Statement
at the New York session (31 October 1988) in MG4127/17/361.
79. Conquest, supra note 3.
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ground as a propagandist for the Information Research Department (IRD)
of the British secret service and suggested that he knowingly used
fraudulent sources in his work.80 The more scholarly of those who
disagreed with his conclusions point to the fact that his sources did not,
perforce, include official Soviet documents and were largely from the
Ukrainian 6migr6 community."' Mace was a post-doctoral fellow at the
Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, and Executive Direc-
tor of the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Ukrainian Famine. He
had published scholarly works82 and edited collections of 6migr6 mem-
oirs. His findings, too, had been subject to criticism both from the left and
some sections of the scholarly community.83 Some scholars questioned
the accuracy of both Conquest's and Mace's demographic projections.8'
Mace's conclusions differed somewhat from those of Conquest in that he
projected a higher number of deaths and asserted that the famine was an
80. For example, Conquest, supra note 3 at 286, uses a famous photograph of an adolescent
girl and her starving brother that he states was described by "a foreign journalist" and taken
from the Los Angeles Herald, February 20, 1935. Douglas Tottle points out that the journalist
in question was the highly controversial "Thomas Walker" who worked for the pro-fascist
William Randolph Hearst, that Walker was never in the Ukraine in 1933, and that he later turned
out to be an escaped convict named Robert Green. D. Tottle, Fraud, Famine and Fascism: the
Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (Toronto: Progress Books, 1987) at 11. The
actual photograph, Tottle claimed, had been published in a Russian journal in the 1920s. Ibid.
at 9. Tottle also challenges the provenance of other photographs used by Conquest, but not
properly identified. Whatever the merits of the argument, Conquest would have been wise not
to simply ignore it since his photo credits were quite non-specific.
81. Conquest defends the validity of using anecdotal information and 6migr6 memoirs not
only because of their sheer volume but also because of the fact that in comparisons they are
mutually confirmatory. Conquest, supra note 3 at 9. He also wrote that "truth can thus only
percolate in the form of hearsay" and that "basically the best, though not infallible, source is
rumor." R. Conquest, The Great Terror (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1973) at 754. One critic suggested
that this "astonishing" method of comparing memoirs and hearsay "would be sound only if
rumors were not repeated and if memoirists did not read each other's works." J. Arch Getty,
Origins of the Great Purges: the Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (N.Y.:
Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 222, n. 12.
82. J.E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism
in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by Harvard University Press for
the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in
the U.S., c. 1983). See also Harvest of Sorrow, supra note 3. Mace was not the prototypical
scholar of Soviet history. A native Oklahoman, he had become interested in Eastern Europe as
an undergraduate and had learned Russian and Ukrainian in university. He was Conquest's
principal research assistant for Harvest of Sorrow, in part because Conquest did not know the
Ukrainian language.
83. Some suggest that the US Congressional Commission on the Ukrainian famine was
basically a political attack on the Soviet Union by the Reagan-era State Department. Indeed,
one reason for the establishment of the International Commission was to avoid the criticism of
being a tool of American foreign policy in the cold war.
84. For example B. Anderson & B. Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastro-
phes in the USSR" (1985) 44 Slavic Review 517; and "Tautologies in the Study of Excess
Mortality in the USSR in the 1930s" (1986) 45 Slavic Review 307.
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act of genocide. The positions taken by these expert witnesses cannot be
viewed as untenable, although their conclusions are certainly debatable.
The problem remains, however, that the Commission did not hear
contrary expert testimony, although the Commission presumably could
have checked the various published sources that challenged the views of
Conquest and Mace.
Much of the primary documentary evidence at Brussels was based on
the conflicting contemporary reports of two journalists, Walter Duranty
and Malcolm Muggeridge. Duranty, Russian correspondent for the New
York Times, reported favourably on Stalin's economic policies and
denied the existence of the famine. He was so influential that his articles
were said to be a factor in Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union in
1933 .85 Muggeridge, a correspondent with the Manchester Guardian,
clandestinely visited the famine area in 1933 and his reports confirming
the famine were smuggled out of Russia in the diplomatic bag. In 1932
Duranty was given the Pulitzer Prize for his efforts, while Muggeridge
was obliged to resign for his troubles. Posterity, however, has been rather
kinder to Muggeridge than to Duranty. General Counsel Hunter has
described Muggeridge as the "most compellingly readable of journal-
ists", while he dismissed Duranty as "an unattractive, over-sexed little
man, with a wooden leg" who falsified facts and who may have been
favorably disposed to Stalin's regime because they allowed him to
exercise his passion for necrophilia. 6 Muggeridge, in the last months of
his life, was unable to make the trip to Brussels. Therefore on June 27,
1988 the Commission held a special evidence-taking session for him at
his home in the presence of Commissioner Draper, Hunter and Chyczij.
It was in this house that Hunter had written his biography of Muggeridge
during a sabbatical leave in 1978-79;17 so one may imagine that Hunter's
cross-examination may have been less than rigorous. In its Final Report,
the Commission accepted as accurate Muggeridge's reporting, while
rejecting that of Duranty, ajudgment that was almost certainly correct.81
85. S. Taylor, Stalin's Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times's Man in Moscow
(N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 188-190.
86. I. Hunter, "In memory of a journalist who in the moment of truth chose honesty over
popularity" Report Newsmagazine 26 (27 March 2000) at 54, online: reprinted under "A tale
of Truth and Two Journalists" http://www.infoukes.com/uccla/issueslgenocide/
ILgncd_032.html (last modified: July 13, 2000). Hunter had known Muggeridge since 1968
when an enduring friendship began. The allegations of necrophilia are mentioned, but neither
confirmed nor denied, Hunter points out, by Duranty's biographer (supra note 85).
87. Book review of Very best of Malcolm Muggeridge by I. Hunter (2000) 8 Catholic Insight 36.
88. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 12-13.
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4. Financial Difficulties
The financial health of the trust fund was extremely important given the
significant expenses involved in supporting the Commission. Sundberg
reported the balance to be US $30,000 on March 30, 1988 (after the
Organizational Meeting) and US $44,564.91 on October 21, 1988 (before
the New York meeting).8 9 The amount of expenses that had already been
paid from the fund at these dates is not clear. It is evident, however, that
there were financial difficulties with the trust fund between these two
dates. Indeed, Sundberg reported to the Commissioners that the fund "had
been put in limbo ... and was not reactivated until October 21, 1988 when
Mr. Morris produced a bank statement."90 The financial situation was so
serious that the New York session appeared to be in jeopardy as late as
October 8, 1988 when Sundberg wrote to Kalba about a number of
problems, 91 including the following: the Petitioner's lawyer, Alexandra
Chyczij, had not been paid for the evidence-taking session with Malcolm
Muggeridge at Robertsbridge, Sussex on June 27, 1988; the Petitioner's
New York counsel, William Liber, was not receiving cooperation from
Chyczij (as a consequence of her non-payment) and was having difficulty
preparing his case; Hunter had not been fully reimbursed for his services
to the Commission, and was unwilling to undertake further work until a
satisfactory payment was received; and there was no money in the trust
fund to allow the Finance Committee to discharge its obligations under
the terms of reference. Under these circumstances, Sundberg felt the New
York session might have to be postponed, and he could not, therefore,
either invite Soviet witnesses or seek the good offices of the UN
Secretary-General. The fact that the Petitioner was able to show a healthy
balance within two weeks would indicate the financial problems were
organizational rather than the result of an actual lack of funds. It should
also be noted that Kalba had sent a substantial per diem advance to all
Commission members just a week before Sundberg's letter of concern.92
Even though the financial difficulties seemed more apparent than real,
there were clearly negative consequences for the Commission. Wit-
nesses, especially potentially hostile witnesses, were not invited to
appear in sufficient time, and evidence was lost.
89. Memorandum by Sundberg to the Members of the International Commission of Inquiry
(12 November 1988) at 2 in MG4127/17/355 [hereinafter Memo 31.
90. Ibid.
91. Letter from Sundberg to Kalba (8 October 1988) in MG4127/17/358.
92. Letter from Kalba to Humphrey (29 September 1988) in MG4127/17/355.
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5. New York Hearings
The New York hearings were similar to those of Brussels. The Petitioner's
Counsel, William Liber, introduced new documents, photographs, more
eyewitness accounts and expert testimony, which included that of Con-
quest and Mace. Humphrey and Verhoeven found themselves to be of like
minds on the question of genocide retroactivity. Humphrey invited
Verhoeven to lecture on the subject at the 1989 Canadian Human Rights
Foundation Summer School in Charlottetown, P.E.I. Verhoeven re-
sponded:
I find your suggestion to deal with the prehistory of the genocide conven-
tion most appealing. Ukraine and other nationalities which were somehow
forgotten in the peace Treaties of 1919 and 1923, like Armenians and
Kurds, supply an excellent basis for looking into the dawn of an interna-
tional protection of human - individual or collective - rights.93
It was during these hearings that Sundberg brought various responses
from Soviet sources to the Commission's attention. The Soviet responses
were letters from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and scholars in the
Ukraine.
6. Embassy Response
Yuri Bogayevsky, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, wrote
to the Commission on seeing the invitation to Ryzhkov. He did not simply
give a "few references to Soviet scholarship", but wrote:
I, whose country of origin is Ukraine, one of the 15 Soviet Republics,
thought it necessary to draw your attention to the following.
For many years, certain circles in Western countries, including Canada,
and in particular the Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalistic groupings, have
been waging a campaign of malicious allegations and speculations around
the so-called issue of 'man-made famine' in the Ukraine in 1932-1933.
Except for rare cases, most of the foreign investigators of that particular
period in the Soviet history totally disregard and continue to disregard the
historical facts and the real reasons of the grave food situation that had
existed in many, not the Ukraine alone, areas of the Soviet Union during
the noted time-period.
With this in view, I assume that the attached article by Prof. Stanislav
Kulchytsky, D.Sc. (History) which, as a clear evidence of the glasnost
atmosphere in our country, has appeared in the No. 2, 1988, issue of the
News from Ukraine weekly newspaper (See page 7), will help you and
other members of your commission make a fair and objective evaluation
of our past, but, as you will see, well remembered history.
93. Letter from Verhoeven to Humphrey (22 November 1988) in MG4127/15/315.
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You can be sure that the Soviet Union has quite enough scientific potential
to make a fair assessment of the more that 50-year-old developments in the
history of our country.
As Mr. S. Kulchytsky rightfully stated in his article, 'all attempts to single
out the sufferings of the Ukrainian people at the expense of keeping back
or diminishing the hardships that fell to the lot of other nations bear the
imprint of the lack of conscientiousness on the part of the investigators and
their obvious inclination to falsifications.'
I hope, Sir, these personal remarks will meet understanding. 9
In short, Bogayevsky stressed the fact that while the WCFU insisted upon
the idea of a localized famine directed at the Ukrainian people, the famine
was far more widely spread. If Bogayevsky's view were accepted, it
would argue against a conclusion of genocide. In Sundberg's case,
Bogayevsky's letter did not "meet understanding" but seemed more a
cause of outrage. He listed the letter as one example of "a Soviet strategy
to torpedo our credibility"'9 5 and urged the Commission to examine ways
it could protect itself against such attacks. Further, he took it upon himself
to write "a letter of concern to the Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa in reply
to the letter of his First Secretary." 96 Sundberg also cited a letter from four
Ukrainian academicians as another example of the Soviet strategy.
7. Ukrainian Academicians
In discussing participation from representatives from the Soviet Union,
the Final Report notes:
The Commission has moreover received a letter of October 14, 1988,
signed by Boris Babij (Member, Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian SSR),
Ivan Kuras (Member correspondent, Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian
SSR), Stanislav Kulchytsky, [Ph. D., (History)], and Volodymyr Denisov
[Ph. D., (Jurisprudence)]. This letter suggests that the Commission should
have predetermined its findings, but also invited 'an honest dialogue, an
open discussion, and objective and comprehensive analysis.' In reply, the
President of the Commission, on November 1, 1988, read a public
statement rebutting the suggestion in the letter. Furthermore, since media
had tended to identify press releases of the Petitioner, i.e. the World
Congress, with press releases from the Commission itself, Petitioner was
asked to rectify this impression, and did so in a press release that was
printed in the New York City Tribune of November 8, 1988.91
94. Letter from Bogayevsky to Sundberg (1 March 1988) in MG4127/17/358. Sundberg did
not circulate this letter and its enclosures, received before the Brussels session, earlier because
he did not consider it part of the Commission documentation, which could be introduced only
by the Petitioner. Sundberg letter, supra note 30.
95. Memo 3, supra note 89 at 1.
96. Ibid. at 7.
97. Final Report, supra note 35 at 4.
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Sundberg's rebuttal actually contained more highly charged language,
stating that the Commission had received a letter "purporting" to be from
the Ukrainian academics and that "because the Commission has not been
able to check the identities of the signers - or to judge possible prejudice
to them - the text is presently embargoed in the Commission's records." 98
However, a majority of the Commission recommended that some of the
letter's contents be made public. This was of necessity done out of
context. It should not have been difficult to check the bona fides of the
authors. Yuri Bogayevsky, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in
Ottawa, had, six months previously, sent the Commission an article by
Kulchytsky (who is now a professor of history at the University of Kiev-
Mohyla Academy). Ivan Kuras is also well known and, subsequently,
served as Vice-Premier of Ukraine (1994-1997).
Sundberg's reaction to this letter seems unduly harsh. Part of the letter
he objected to reads as follows:
As academicians, we would understand the desire of specialists in the field
of international law to make their contribution to the illumination of one
of the most dramatic pages in the history of our people. However, we
cannot but be concerned and attentive to the fact that long before the
process of inquiry is to be completed, certain members of the commission
have made public statements alluding to their predisposition toward the
theory of 'famine-genocide' against the Ukrainian people, and thereby,
predetermining their findings."
The concerns raised seem legitimate given the acknowledged fact that the
WCFU was releasing press notices that appeared to emanate from the
Commission and that these notices did use prejudicial terms like "famine-
genocide". The academicians could be forgiven for misunderstanding
these ambiguous press releases. The WCFU's only corrective action,
placing a clarification in the New York City Tribune, appears somewhat
inadequate.
The Final Report does not directly address some of the interesting
substantive issues raised by the academicians; one hopes this omission
was not occasioned by annoyance and the predetermination suggestion.
The academicians acknowledged that the famine took place and that
Soviet academics were "compelled" to remain silent on the topic until
very recently. They expressed the opinion that the tragic famine was not
the result of a policy of "famine-genocide", but rather resulted from the
convergence of a number of factors. The principal causes were the
98. Statement by the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry on the 1932-33 Famine in the
Ukraine in MG4127/17/354.
99. Letter from Ukrainian academicians to Sundberg (14 October 1988). Translated for the
Commission in MG4127/17/358.
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"forced collectivization of agriculture, the ruthless policy of grain pro-
curement, drastic deviation from Lenin's principles towards the peas-
antry and cooperatives, Stalin's leap towards industrialization, which
was accomplished at the cost of the peasantry, etc." ° The Ukrainian
academicians advocated:
... an honest dialogue, an open discussion [and] an objective and compre-
hensive analysis. Such an approach is ever more evident in the position of
many western researchers, who doubt the sincerity and good will of those
who support the myth of 'famine-genocide' -G. [sic] A. Getty, R.W. Davis
[sic],' 0' B. Anderson, B. Silver, D. Tottle, D. Coplon, and others.
The Commission heard evidence from the scholars Conquest and Mace.
It seemed reasonable for the academicians to suggest that the Commis-
sion contact scholars with different opinions. Certainly Barbara A.
Anderson, sociologist and demographer at the University of Michigan
Population Studies Center, J. Arch Getty, professor of history at the
University of California, Riverside, and Brian D. Silver, professor of
political science at Michigan State University, are all respected and
widely published scholars. R.W. Davies, Professor Emeritus of the
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birming-
ham, U.K., is a hugely prolific scholar in the area of Soviet history,
especially Stalin's economic policies. 12 Anderson and Silver had pub-
lished articles'013 critical of Mace's estimate of eight million deaths,
suggesting there was a difference between starvation death and excess
mortality. Mace's method of calculation included many who would never
have been born, their parents having died or migrated prior to their
anticipated birth. All of the above-mentioned academics could have
provided the Commission important scholarly testimony. Jeff Coplon, a
journalist and ghostwriter, was perhaps a less useful suggested source,
although his polemic article,'t° a popularization of Douglas Tottle's
conclusions, was given to the Commission along with a rebuttal from
Conquest. Tottle was a left-wing Canadian trade unionist, who had
written a monograph'05 challenging the authenticity and accuracy of
100. Ibid.
101. The spelling mistakes in the names of Getty and Davies might well have been a result
of Kalba's translation and transliteration, and not the fault of the academicians.
102. Davies might be generally recognized as more deserving of the plaudits that Liber gave
Conquest as the most learned scholar on Soviet history in the western world. He is currently
lead scholar on a team investigating the famine based on materials in the Soviet archives.
103. Supra note 84.
104. J. Coplon, "In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: a 55-year-old Famine Feeds the Right"
Village Voice (12 January 1988).
105. Tottle, supra note 80 at 73. Somewhat ironically Tottle used Mace's demographic
methodology on the population of Saskatchewan between 1931 and 1941, discovering that
25% of that population were apparently victims of famine-genocide.
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many of the sources used in "famine-genocide" scholarship. In particular,
he showed that some frequently used materials were based on Nazi and
right-wing U.S. propaganda, that the demographic methodologies of
estimating deaths were flawed, and that the motion picture, Harvest of
Despair, used many still photographs from other periods or of doubtful
provenance.
Sundberg gave his view of the academicians' letter as follows: "While
this letter seems to invite 'an honest dialogue, an open discussion, an
objective and comprehensive analysis', this invitation seems, on closer
reading, to be limited to Mr. Tottle et cons."1°6 His 'closer reading' of the
letter, as an invitation limited to Tottle, seems a little perverse. Sundberg
later expressed the view that he felt that, in mentioning the western
scholars, the academicians were making suggestions for further reading
rather than suggesting expert witnesses. Indeed, he felt the academicians
were suggesting that reference to the works of these scholars would
render the Commission's activities unnecessary. However, he found the
suggestion of Tottle as a source "interesting" in part because his book
indicated access to secret KGB materials. He doubted, however, that
Tottle "would expose himself to cross-examination by a clever lawyer for
the petitioner." 107
8. In Search of Tottle
Thus, although the academicians' letter raised the question of taking the
testimony of a number of experts who held views contrary to those of
Conquest and Mace, efforts were principally directed to securing Tottle' s
testimony. These attempts were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons
including the reluctance of Petitioner's Counsel, William Liber, to
produce a "hostile witness", such as Tottle, 1°0 followed by the practical
problems in attempting to contact Tottle encountered by the Legal
Secretary of the Commission, Adrian Jenkala. At length, it was left to the
General Counsel, Dr. Hunter, to invite Tottle to appear, although it was
not expected that Tottle would accept the invitation.109 While the Com-
106. Memo 3, supra note 89 at 1. Sundberg explained the abbreviation "et cons" as follows:
"The little reference to 'Mr Tottle et cons.' should be understood as 'Mr Tottle et consortes'
which is a mild way to suggest that Mr Tottle was not alone in his enterprise but probably
enjoyed important help from people in the Soviet Union, e.g. KGB people. The basis for this
is of course that Mr Tottle's book was built on and included a documentation that could not be
available to a private person without official Soviet blessing of some kind." Email from
Sundberg to Hobbins (23 April 2001).
107. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
108. While most of the Commissioners felt Tottle's evidence would be useful, Sundberg felt
Tottle would never subject himself to any cross-examination.
109. Sundberg, supra note 89 at 2-3.
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missioners wanted to hear Tottle's evidence, debatable as it may have
been, Sundberg did not believe Tottle would appear. He thought little of
the book, which he had perused, stating that it had "the appearance of
being part of a more general anti-Conquest effort, caused by the publica-
tion of dr Conquest's book... ."10 He informed the Commissioners that
Tottle's publisher, Progress Books, "...is believed to be the publishing
outlet of the Canadian Communist Party."' " While he did not state the
source of this belief, it may be assumed to have been Kalba. Finally,
because Tottle's book was well documented, he pointed out that in "its
detail this book suggests that the author has had access to classified
information at a scale indicating resort to Soviet sources." 12 Unlike his
fellow Commissioners, Sundberg felt that while expert testimony was
useful in providing context, it was not essential because the real answers
lay in the primary sources. 3 He finally dismissed the possibility of Tottle
testifying, telling the Commissioners:
Moreover, the news transmitted from Canada have [sic] included no
indication that Mr Tottle has responded to our invitation, or indeed that he
has ever received it. In the present situation it is believed to be no need to
press further for a special Tottle session.114
Thus the unsuccessful and seemingly half-hearted attempts of the
Commission's President, its General Counsel and the Petitioner to have
Tottle or any other scholars of divergent views testify, denied potentially
important testimony to the Commissioners. The General Counsel, whose
explicit role was to present the Commission with all sides of an issue,
must be assigned some responsibility for this problem. Inevitably, the
lacuna would have a negative impact on the credibility of the Final
Report.
9. Post Mortems on New York
Views of the New York session differed. Humphrey told Kalba that it
"was in my opinion a useful exercise."' 15 James Mace, on the other hand,
was alarmed by what he observed and wrote Kalba a lengthy letter on the
subject.' 6 This letter is reproduced here in full since it not only expresses
Mace's view of the New York session, but sheds light on other issues such
110. Memorandum 4 from Sundberg to the Members of the International Commission of
Inquiry (6 July 1989) Annex I at I in MG4 127/17/355 [hereinafter Memo 4].
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
114. Ibid. at2.
115. Letter from Humphrey to Kalba (8 November 1988) in MG4127/17/356.
116. Letter from Mace to Kalba (8 November 1988) in MG4127/17/357.
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as the rivalries within the Ukrainian community, the independence of the
Commission secretariat and the role reversal of witnesses in preparing
counsel regarding their testimony. The letter reads:
It was, as always, a pleasure to see you in New York, but I fear the direction
things seem to be taking gives some cause for concern. Please correct me
if I am wrong, but it seems to me that things are not going well in terms of
the. presentation of the petitioner's case. While I am certain that Mr.
William Liber is a talented barrister, his summation of the case did not
seem to show him in his best light. Even after I spent five hours with him,
he did not seem to understand his case particularly well, and very little he
said would have helped me to understand the case were I a member of the
International Commission. Alexandra Chyczyj, who replaced John Sopinka
in Brussels, may not have been a high-powered Queen's Counsel, but she
knew what she and the issues were about. There is often a tendency to think
that, since you know you are right, everyone else will find your righteous-
ness as obvious as you do. This is a false assumption, and, as a result, the
World Congress of Free Ukrainians is now in the awkward position of
losing a case in an ersatz court of its own making.
I have neither the standing nor the desire to unduly influence the direction
of the International Commissions work, but the problem now seems an
obvious one, which calls for the efforts of everyone seriously interested in
the tragedy Ukrainians suffered to attempt to insure [sic] that the
Commission's work be of the highest quality. Should the finding of the
International Commission of Inquiry substantially contradict those of the
US Commission on the Ukraine Famine, this would be a tragedy to those
who have sought to document the intentionality of official policies which
exacerbated the famine, to those who survived to bear witness, to the
sponsoring body, and to the Ukrainian community as a whole. It would
also strengthen those forces which seek to diminish the crime committed
against the Ukrainian nation by Stalin in that it would allow them to
juxtapose the findings of the International Commission to those of the US
Commission in the hope of discrediting the latter.
I have kept to myself any reservations I had about the creation of an
International Commission at a time when the work of the US Commission
was already underway. It was, I felt, the business of the World Congress
of Free Ukrainians and not mine. The reasons for these reservations should
now be all too apparent. The prestige of the World Congress is tremendous
among freedom-loving Ukrainians in the Soviet Union because it is the
only body which represents all segments of the Ukrainian community in
the Free World. This prestige meant that it would overshadow the Ameri-
can Commission in its impact among those who look to the Ukrainian
diaspora for inspiration and leadership. Yet, the fact that it is the ad hoc
creation of a Ukrainian community body meant that if it found the
Ukrainians were victims of genocide, its impact would be small, because
Stalin's defenders could dismiss it as a creature of the Ukrainian nation-
alists. If, however, it were to find that Ukrainians were not victims of
genocide, its impact would be far greater for precisely this same reason.
Such a creation, which promises little gain but holds the danger of
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substantial losses, never seemed to me very well conceived, except in the
context of the intra-community political intrigues with which we are, alas,
all too familiar. Despite the best of intentions, I think it has become a pawn
in those intrigues of the Banderivtsy versus their opponents, Bilynsky
versus Flis, 117 your Commission versus mine, while the community and
our reputations will pay the cost. It may be grossly unfair, but so is life.
Old General Fylynowycz, who died not long ago in Minneapolis, half a
century ago published a journal in Rumania called Hurtiemosia!"8 It is
time for us all to do precisely that if we are to prevent a very unfortunate
situation. Please send me everything that has been presented and every-
thing transcribed from both sessions (Brussels immediately and New York
as soon as possible). Please also send me the address and phone number of
Adrian Jenkala in England, since I will need to discuss with him precisely
what needs to be emphasized in the Commissioners' deliberations and
what needs to be explained. If there is any way, politically and financially,
for you to dump Liber and retain Chyczyj, I urge you to do so. Results
matter more than titles, and you need someone who is bright more than you
need the letters Q.C. on a business card. This is a crisis situation, and
saving the situation requires doing everything possible as soon as humanly
possible. You must also immediately explain the situation to Mr. Ignat
[sic] Bilynsky and insist that the Ukrainian Congress of America [sic] give
you whatever money you need to hold a third session of the Commission
in Toronto. I know Mr. Hunter wants to call Dmitry Pospielovsky," 9 who
will not be on your side, but you ought to use it to shore up your case as well
because you need it. Think of the alternative: a commission created by the
Ukrainians themselves finding that the famine had nothing in particular to
117. Mace is referring to a deep division in the Ukrainian-American community. The original
Banderivtsy were the members of Nationalist leader Stepan Bandera's Ukrainian Insurgent
Army. Bandera was assassinated by the KGB in 1959. Their opponents in the wartime Ukraine
were the Melnykivtsi, followers of Andriy Melnyk. These groups formed as a result of a split
in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1940. In this context, however, the
Banderivtsy were the Liberation Front of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
(UCCA), an umbrella group representing all Ukrainian-American organizations. Ihnat Bilynsky
(1917-1992) (sometimes written Ignatius Bilinsky or Billinsky) was a member of the WCFU
Secretariat from 1967, and General Secretary (1970-1971). He was a Chairman of the WCFU
Famine Commission (1984-1990) and Chairman of the WCFU Audit Committee (1983-1988).
In 1980 at the 13th Congress of the UCCA, the Ukrainian National Association (UNA) walked
out and formed the Law and Order Committee. When negotiations to heal the rift broke down
the dissidents formed a second umbrella organization, the Ukrainian American Coordinating
Council (UACC). Dr. John 0. Flis, Supreme President of the Chicago-based UNA, became
first President of the UACC. Both the UACC and the UCCA attended the 1983 WCFU
Congress, each attempting to be the principal umbrella organization for Ukrainian-American
groups. Over the next few years all attempts to heal this rift failed. In fact, by the time of the
1988 WCFU Congress, the two organizations were joined by a third US umbrella group, the
Conference of Neutral Organizations, which wished to remain aloof from the feud.
118. It is not quite clear what this title means. It appears to be a combination of htrtie (paper
or document) and mo'ie (estate, land or fatherland), but this does not make a great deal of sense
in the context.
119. Dmitry Pospielovsky is a history professor at the University of Western Ontario,
Hunter's own university.
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do with Stalin's policies towards Ukrainians, that it was merely an
unintentioned and unfortunate side-effect of the ill-conceived forcible
collectivization of agriculture.
The case which the World Congress of Free Ukrainians hoped to win is by
no means untenable, but it can only be won if those who argue it are
competent and understand it. This was not what I saw in New York.
It is evident from this letter that Mace perceived the Secretariat to be
working for the Petitioner as much as for the Commission. Kalba did not
share this letter with counsel, for obvious reasons, but approached
Sundberg directly about holding a third evidence-taking session in
Toronto.
10. A Third Evidence-Taking Session?
Sundberg appeared to respond favourably to the proposal for a Toronto
session. He wrote to Kalba, telling him that he may consider himself, "the
appropriate person to undertake the organization of this working ses-
sion." 120 However he cautioned Kalba of the need to involve Hunter and
Liber) 2  Humphrey, while he had no objection to further sessions, was
disturbed that Sundberg should proceed without any consultation. He
viewed this as a mistake because "we are already too closely associated
in the public mind with Canadian Ukrainians."' 22 Kalba faxed Humphrey's
letter to Sundberg, who then wrote to Humphrey elaborating his own
dependence on Kalba's organization:
Setting up a Third Session means of course a great deal more work and is
dependant [sic] on the availability of a great deal of money. dr Kalba is still
the man who really makes the organization move. Do not overestimate the
possibilities of remote control from Stockholm.23
Humphrey responded that he had not realized "any final decision had
been taken in New York regarding the next session of the tribunal.'
124
Draper supported Humphrey's views, writing "... [Ilt would be advisable
not to hold the final session in Canada where the Ukrain [sic] organization
has its siege.'"125 When plans to hold a Toronto meeting had been
abandoned, Oliver noted,
As now we'll meet in London the worry expressed in your letter as to locale
of the next sitting has shrunk. But I do wish, as Kalba will tell you, that we
could, with counsel present and you presiding, DEPOSE a few people in
Canada before October.126
120. Memo 3, supra note 89 Sect. 6e, at 7.
121. Letter from Sundberg to Kalba (3 January 1989) in MG4127"17/358.
122. Letter from Humphrey to Kalba (4 January 1989) in MG4127/17/356.
123. Letter from Sundberg to Humphrey (12 January 1989) in MG4127/17/358.
124. Letter from Humphrey to Sundberg (1 February 1989) in MG4127/17/358.
125. Letter from Draper to Humphrey (30 April 1989) in MG4127/17/357.
126. Letter from Oliver to Humphrey (18 May 1989) in MG4127/17/357.
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When Hunter, who was experiencing some professional difficulties of his
own since the New York hearings, 27 became aware of Kalba's activities,
including sending documentation to Sundberg, he gave the President a
frank opinion of the matter, writing:
It is entirely inappropriate, in my opinion, for Dr. Kalba to be sending
material to you or to the Commissioners. The World Congress of Free
Ukrainians was represented at the hearings by Messrs. Sopinka and Liber,
not by Dr. Kalba. All books and documents relevant to the issues before
the Commission, and properly admissible in evidence, were put in as
Exhibits in either Brussels or New York. These materials are ample, in my
opinion, to address the outstanding issues.
I do not intend to review any 'package' of documents submitted by Dr.
Kalba for three reasons: (1) they are not properly before the Commission;
(2) the 'evidence taking' portion of the hearings were [sic] conducted in
Brussels, England and New York; I would strenuously object to Mr. Liber
attempting, ex parte, to contact the Commission and to seek now to put
before them documents not properly introduced in evidence; Mr. Liber
would not do that because, as a barrister, he is bound by a code of
professional ethics. I object no less strenuously that this should be
attempted by Dr. Kalba. (3) My retainer was for the conduct of the
hearings. The hearings are complete. If the Commissioners wish me to be
further involved in their deliberations a new retainer, arranged directly
with the Commission would be required.2
Kalba responded that he had been discussing recent Soviet publications
of the famine with Sundberg and sent some translations as a sample. He
stated Sundberg wanted to study the articles before deciding whether they
would be used as new evidence for a separate public session or could
simply be circulated by Sundberg as additional items.129 Liber' s response
to Hunter included the formal request for an additional session, indicating
two reasons in particular for such a session: first, to review evidence
concerning the constitution of the U.S.S.R. and Ukraine during the
famine; and second, to consider various articles on the famine published
in the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere following completion of the hearings. 3 °
127. Hunter had been a panel member on an Ontario Human Rights Commission hearing, but
was requested to resign in January 1989 over allegations of bias. Specifically it was stated that
he had commented publicly at a 1987 Charlottetown Human Rights Conference on the case that
was still before the Commission. D. Henton, "Remarks force rights commissioner out,"
Toronto Star (13 January 1989) A9. Hunter stated in his letter of resignation that he disagreed
with the allegation but felt it was inappropriate to go to court over the issue. The Human Rights
Conference was the annual summer school organized by Humphrey under the sponsorship of
the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, where Hunter spoke on "The protection of minorities
and the prevention of discrimination."
128. Letter from Hunter to Sundberg, copies to Kalba and Liber (16 March 1989) in MG4127/
17/355.
129. Letter from Kalba to Hunter (5 April 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
130. Letter from Liber to Hunter (16 May 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
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Hunter wrote to Sundberg strongly opposing Liber' s request for much the
same reasons as he had given earlier.131 However, two weeks later, Kalba
discussed the one-day session with Hunter and reported to Sundberg that
Hunter had agreed to the Toronto location and a supplementary fee of
$2,000.00 for his services. 32 The matter dragged on throughout the
summer with no firm decision on whether or not to hold a third session.
IV. The Cultural Revolution
On July 6, 1989 Sundberg sent his fellow Commissioners a lengthy
memorandum.133 In addition to informing them of Draper's death three
days previously and giving an update on the Tottle situation, he wrote:
Professor Sundberg has been victimized by a Cultural Revolution at the
University of Stockholm (see Annex 1) which has kept him very busy
defending his Chair. Much of his working time has thus been consumed
which otherwise would have gone into work on the Final Report. There is
some suspicion that the Stockholm events are somehow connected with
the ongoing work of the International Commission of Inquiry.
Annex 1134 is a six-page account of Sundberg's difficulties at his
University naming those who "masterminded" the campaign against him
beginning in the spring of 1988. Some of Annex 1 was subsequently
published'35 and became more broadly known as the ius docendi Af-
fair. 136
At the heart of the controversy was Sundberg's disagreement with a
number of established Swedish political and legal academic views,
including his opposition to the legal positivism of Swedish philosopher
Axel Higerstrdm, and his critical views on Marxism and socialism.
Unlike the positivists, for example, Sundberg suggested that there were
rules, such as those of the European Convention on Human Rights, that
could take precedence over Swedish domestic law.'37 Further, when
131. Letter from Hunter to Sundberg (23 May 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
132. Letter from Kalba to Sundberg (8 June 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
133. Memo 4, supra note 110.
134. Ibid. Annex 1 is entitled On the Cultural Revolution at the University of Stockholm
[hereinafter Annex 1].
135. J. Sundberg, "The Law of Nature, the Uppsala school and the ius docendi Affair" (1989)
9:1 Vera Lex 3. A lengthier account of the affair, including a number of the original documents,
can be found in "Academic Freedom at the University of Stockholm" (1991) 29 Minerva 321
[hereinafter "Academic Freedom"]. This account was assembled by the journal editor, Edward
Shils.
136. In addition to the Commission material in the Humphrey Archives, the authors are
grateful to Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School for sending her documents and
comments on the ius docendi affair. Jacob Sundberg also kindly provided great detail of his
perception of the affair.
137. Sundberg's thinking can be found in his article, "Scandanavian Unrealism: Co-report on
Scandanavian Philosophy" (1986) 20:9 Rechtstheorie 307.
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touching upon Marxism in his Jurisprudence course, Sundberg only
focused on what its basic principles meant in practical legal application,
an approach that ran contrary to the conventional wisdom of how
Marxism should be presented in Swedish law schools. While these
disagreements should have been essentially academic disputes, a crisis
arose when a student, with whom there had been previous problems,
complained "without any kind of specification, about having been
subjected to 'rightist-extremist' and 'fascist' propaganda in my teaching
and examination." As a result of the complaints, the Board of Line,138
dominated by Sundberg's academic opponents, appointed a five-man
working group to look into the merits of the complaint. Little came of this
inquiry since the matter was beyond the competence of the Board.
However, the group turned to examining Sundberg's conduct in his
course in Jurisprudence. The group's report criticized the instruction of
the course for "lack of scientific basis", "onesidedness" and "politiciz-
ing", based, by Sundberg's count, on the complaints of six students out
of 150. Sundberg discounted the complaints, saying that they came from
students "who all have a strong leftist orientation." 139 The group assigned
to look into the complaints also focused on the question of "whether there
is any necessary connection between Marxist ideology and genocide,"'4 °
a connection that had been made by Sundberg. Sundberg was concerned
with the attention focussed upon his views of the connection between
Marxism and genocide. He stated:
[B]ut if you connect this with the line going back to Tottle, the interest
becomes intelligible. The connection between Marxist ideology and
genocide is a crucial point in the considerations of the International
Commission, and it is therefore a natural point of attack for those interests
who would like to sabotage and impede the advance of the Commission's
reasoning on this point.
The fact that dr Victorin, by his letter of January 28, 1989, has found reason
to address the members of the international scholarly community on this
point certainly testifies to its importance to himself. The fact he finds it so
important though, and the fact that dr Peterson via dr Gerner is so
genuinely interest[ed] in how necessary the connection is between Marxist
ideology and the Ukrainian famine 1932-33, would seem to suggest that
there is a direct link between the attack launched on me, attempting to have
me removed from teaching Jurisprudence, using dr Victorin's favourite
138. Sundberg, supra note 135 at 4. Sundberg defines the Board of Line as the Law faculty's
equivalent of a Curriculum Committee.
139. Ibid. at 5. None of the complainants failed the course. The only student who failed the
course did not complain but was, significantly, the sister of Claes Peterson, a member of the
Board of Line. Email from Sundberg to Hobbins (20 March 2001).
140. Ibid.
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line that 'a teacher who is unsuitable may be given other teaching
assignments'. In the thinking permeating this Cultural Revolution at the
University of Stockholm, 'unsuitability' is equivalent to raising the
question of the link between Marxist ideology and genocide. So far, the
Revolution is not a success: the fortress did not fall to the first attack. But
should it succeed in the future, it will certainly mean a stumbling stone for
the advance of the inquiry into the famine in Ukraine 1932-33. It does not
seem unreasonable that this was in fact one of the purposes behind the
whole campaign. 4'
Sundberg more than held his own during this struggle, and his right to
teach was ultimately upheld. However, the episode clearly affected him
in terms of chairing the Commission, especially by limiting the amount
of time he could devote to the work of the Commission.
It can be imagined that Sundberg's communication in Annex 1,
whatever the merits of his case, caused considerable consternation among
his fellow Commissioners. It would seem bad enough that the President
believed that there could be a conspiracy against the Commission taking
the form of a personal attack in the President's home university. 4 2 When
this was compounded by the President's expressed view that genocide is
a required element of Marxism, it was even more worrying given the
Commission's mandate. Oliver wrote back immediately, saying:
As I have stated before I am not willing to be a party to a 1989 or 1990 legal
decision on the 1931-32 [sic] Ukrainian famine situation that is textually
and analytically based on 'Genocide', a term unknown to the law until the
Convention of December 9, 1948, which was put forward specifically to
meet a 'gap' in the customary international law of human rights.
Thus I object to the use of 'Genocide' as an acceptable legal characteriza-
tion of the terrible events presented to us in evidence.
Further, I strongly believe that retrospective application of punitive
(criminal) normative concepts is of itself a major violation of the human
rights of those accused. Nothing in the post WW H war crimes trials goes
so far as to retroactivity. And we should shun unprofessional
'sloganeering'. 141
A few weeks after this memorandum, Sundberg came to Montreal and the
unsettled question of a third evidence-taking session re-emerged.
141. Annex 1, supra note 134.
142. Sundberg still believes there was a connection between the ius docendi affair and the
Commission's work based on circumstantial evidence and the strong balance of probability.
However, he has not to date uncovered any direct evidence and, as he wryly remarked with no
great expectation it would come to pass, "nobody from the old Soviet Union has come forward
and testified in the matter, at least not to my knowledge!" Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
143. Memorandum 5 from Oliver via Sundberg to the Members of the International
Commission of Inquiry (17 July 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
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On August 31, 1989, Kalba secured Humphrey's agreement to chair a
"short" meeting in Toronto.'
Simon Kalba called this morning to tell me that the session of the tribunal
on the Ukrainian [famine,] which was to meet in Toronto on Wednesday
and over which I was to preside, has been cancelled. It seems that Ian
Hunter, the tribunal legal counsel [sicl, is saying that there is enough
evidence in the record to serve as a basis for a judgement. I do not agree.
Most of what we now have is the testimony of people like Conquest who
have been writing about the question for years. What we need is the
testimony of Soviet scholars who are writing about the matter now.
Sundberg ... will in any event be in Montreal on Wednesday to attend a
conference here at McGill .... and he wants to see me.'
45
After this meeting Humphrey reported:
I have spent a good part of the day with Sundberg and 146 of the Congress
of Ukrainians. Sundberg is obviously in a highly emotional state and it is
difficult to get him to agree with anything. If he stays on as chairman of the
tribunal on the famine the result is likely to be a disaster. Danyliw says that
it is because of fear and the attacks that are being made on him in Sweden
as an ultra rightist.
Liber filed another Notice of Application to reopen the proceedings on
September 14, 1989. Humphrey recorded his reaction to this event as
follows:
The plot thickens in the matter of the inquiry into the causes of the 1932-
33 famine in the Ukraine. Sundberg ... obviously does not want any more
evidence brought into the record. The meeting which was to have taken
place under my chairmanship in Toronto was cancelled on whose decision
I do not know, possibly Sundberg's but perhaps also Ian Hunter...
This morning at any event I received a fax from Toronto containing a
notice of application to reopen the proceedings. I told Sundberg, who is
still here, that I was in favour of granting the application but he began
putting so many different interpretations on my acceptance that I finally
put it into writing; and I have now informed Liber of this 47 and [will] send
a copy of my letter to all members of the Commission.141
144. Humphrey diary entry (I September 1989) "Diary 1989 - 1999" in MG4127/20/16
[hereinafter Humphrey Diary].
145. Ibid. (it September 1989).
146. Humphrey left blank spaces in his diaries when he could not remember or spell the name
of an individual. His intention was to insert the name later, but on occasion, as in this case, he
never did. Sundberg, who considered the visit simply a courtesy call, could not remember
anyone else present unless it were Danyliw. Email from Sundberg to Hobbins (23 April 2001).
147. Letter from Humphrey to Liber (15 September 1989) in MG4127/17/358.
148. Humphrey Diary, supra note 144 (15 September 1989).
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Hunter remained opposed to hearing new testimony. 49 Since the
Commission was to meet in London in November to work on the Final
Report, Sundberg decided to defer the decision of whether to hear new
testimony until this session. However, he asked the "Petitioner and
General Counsel to make reservations for a mini-hearing in Toronto on
December 14, 1989, and to make sure Dr. Krawchenko'5 ° would be
prepared to appear on that date."'' Thus, it was in a somewhat unsettled
condition that the Commissioners met to discuss the Final Report.
V. The London Session
At the London session the Commissioners, perhaps puzzled by the
concept of hearing new evidence after they had drafted the Final Report,
decided not to hold the special evidence-taking session in Toronto.
Sundberg had been under great strain throughout the previous year and
his difficulties were in no small measure responsible for the delays in the
preparation of the Final Report. Aside from the ius docendi dispute, he
was increasingly prey to the fear of danger to the credibility, if not the
integrity, of the Commissioners from leftist attacks. 5 2 Humphrey hoped
that Sundberg, given his situation, might resign the presidency, and
Verhoeven urged him to consider doing so:
We had a private - tough - meeting in London (with his wife (not mine),
whose presence in fact was very useful). I told him that he should resign
if he felt unable to finish the job that he had accepted, it being understood
that I was ready to assume my role of vice-president. But he preferred to
stay in.'53
149. Letter from Oliver to Humphrey (22 September 1989) in MG4127/17/358. Kalba had
told Oliver "Hunter is dead set against taking more testimony."
150. Sundberg is referring to Bohdan Krawchenko, who is currently pro-rector of the
Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine, Kiev. At this time he
was professor of interdisciplinary studies, Department of Slavic and Eastern European Studies,
and director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. He had
written, Social Change and National Consciousness in 20th Century Ukraine (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985); co-edited Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (Edmonton: Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986); and authored articles such as "The Great Famine of 1932-
1933 in Soviet Ukraine" Oko (Montreal) 5:6 (July-August 1983) 10; Reprinted from: One
World (Calgary, Alberta Teachers Assn.) 20:1 (Spring 1982). The Petitioner had announced
at Brussels its intention to have Krawchenko testify at the New York hearings but he was
unavailable at the time. J. Sopinka, Opening Statement (Toronto: Stikeman, Elliott, n.d.) at 16.
151. Memorandum 6 from Sundberg to the Members of the International Commission of
Inquiry (9 October 1989) in MG4127/17/355.
152. Verhoeven, supra note 22.
153. Ibid.
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Just before the meeting Humphrey had dinner with Oliver and recorded:
We are pretty much on the same wave-length about the tribunal report,
apart from some difference about the meaning of the word 'genocide' - I
do not think that it is necessarily limited to the definition in. the 1948
Convention. 54
The London Session highlighted the growing rift between Sundberg and
the other Commissioners. The work of drafting the report had been given
to Verhoeven, who undertook this lengthy and difficult task pro bono. 55
The task was made more time-consuming by Sundberg's insistence on a
detailed index because he "wished to check the accuracy of each sentence
of the draft report.' 56 The draft report and index were given to all
Commissioners. The intent was to use this draft to discover points of
agreement and disagreement on the various questions the Commission
had to answer. Sundberg was unhappy with the Verhoeven draft and
clashed with the other Commissioners, apparently led by Humphrey. In
his diary entry for November 21, 1989 Humphrey wrote:
The meeting in London was no picnic. The chairman of the tribunal, Jacob
Sundberg, seemed to want to sabotage the whole operation. He objected
to many parts of Verhoeven's draft as being "dangerous". He also said that
he personally would re-write the report; and when I moved that it be
adopted subject to the right of members to submit separate comments
either concurring in or dissenting from specific statements or arguments,
he voted against the motion. He also had his own agenda for the London
meeting but again I moved that we follow Verhoeven' s draft paragraph by
paragraph, which we finally did. And he said there would be another
session of the tribunal in Stockholm. All this was, I think, directed to
improve his damaged image in Sweden. 57
Sundberg had his own view of the reason for the divergence of opinion
with the other Commissioners. He had originally insisted that their group:
[s]hould be a Commission of Inquiry and not a Tribunal. I think the other
members of the Commission did not care too much about the issue. At that
time the world was full of 'tribunals' which delivered 'judgements' in all
sorts of matters, and I think my colleagues saw our exercise as being
another variety of that. They were willing to allow me to pursue my
legalistic thinking but I do not think they took it too seriously. 58
154. Humphrey Diary, supra note 144 (12 November 1989).
155. Sundberg and, to some extent, Humphrey were surprised Verhoeven refused any fee
other than expense reimbursement for this arduous task. Verhoeven, supra note 22.
156. Ibid.
157. Humphrey Diary, supra note 144 (21 November 1989).
158. Sundberg to Hobbins, supra note 17.
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Regarding the Final Report he wrote:
... [t]he Commission split into many separate votes. My colleagues were
not overly interested in fine legal points, they wanted to get the matter over
with, and they wrote accordingly. Personally, I was fascinated by the
Soviet tabooing operation and by the fact the whole famine was indeed run
by means of statutes and ordinances and written orders. There was little
need for hearing witnesses when this documentation was at the table. 159
Verhoeven recalls how difficult the London session was and how the
index, created with such labour, was in his view useless.
The members of the Commission, including the president, had made no
use of the index when we met in London to discuss the draft. Sundberg
required that I justify on the basis of the documentation each affirmation
or finding contained in the draft report. He relied on his previous practice
as a judge. I remember saying simply, with the tacit approval of the other
members: you have the index, make use of it. 60
Verhoeven feels that the diplomatic skills of Oliver were extremely
useful in this difficult session. 161 No further drafting session was held at
Stockholm or elsewhere. Verhoeven' s draft became the majority opinion
with minor modifications, while some other Commissioners prepared
additional statements over the next few months.
VI. Final Report
The Final Report of the Commission unsurprisingly lacked unanimity.
While the Commissioners had little difficulty answering the first three
questions in their terms of reference, the last question was far thornier.
They concluded that there had indeed been a famine in 1932-1933.
However, by the time they reached this conclusion, the fact had already
been acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Regarding the extent of the
famine, they stated that it went far beyond the borders of the Ukraine and
was not therefore specifically directed at the Ukrainian people. The
immediate cause of the famine was determined to be the excessive
compulsory grain requisitions, exacerbated by the other Soviet policies
of collectivization, denationalism and dekulakization. In view of this, the
famine was considered to be "man-made in the sense that its immediate
origin lies in human behaviour ... and not ... in climatic conditions or in
natural catastrophes."' 162 However, the Commission found no evidence
159. Ibid.
160. Verhoeven, supra note 22. In fact Sundberg ultimately did make good use of the index
when he reissued the Final Report, supra note 35. Sundberg felt the index was essential so the
Final Report could be quickly and easily defended should any aspect come under attack.
Verhoeven compiled the index simply for the convenience of the Commissioners when
drafting the document.
161. Ibid.
162. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 44.
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that the famine was part of a preconceived plan to starve Ukrainians or
that there was any connection between that result and the various Soviet
policies that exacerbated the famine.'63 Regarding the effect of the
famine the Commissioners could not make a reliable estimate of the
number who perished in the Ukraine, but placed the figure at no less 4.5
million.1 A
With respect to the fourth question, dealing with recommendations as
to the group or individual responsible, the Commissioners became
sharply divided. So sharp was the division that, of the six surviving
Commissioners, 165 only Humphrey did not write a report. He endorsed
the majority opinion prepared by Verhoeven. 166 The Commission was
essentially divided on who the groups or individuals responsible were
and, especially, if they had committed acts of genocide. In terms of
personal responsibility, although the majority report mentioned many
names of those involved, they found it impossible to make a finding
against anyone other than Stalin owing to his absolute control over the
Politburo.
On the question of genocide, the Commission generally agreed that in
order for the events to be called genocide, it must be determined not only
that the required elements of the crime were present but also whether a
rule condemning genocide existed at the time of the events. 167 Regarding
the constituent elements of genocide, it was concluded that the Ukraini-
ans represented "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" and that
the Soviet policies had resulted in several of the acts enumerated in the
Genocide Convention. 163 The question of whether there was "intent to
destroy in whole or in part" the Ukrainian group was a far more difficult
question. The Commission majority deemed it "plausible that the con-
stituent elements of genocide were in existence at the time" of the
famine. 169 They further argued that, although penal laws were non-
retroactive, genocide would be illegal even before the term was coined
163. This conclusion was farsighted since, in the intervening decade when the Soviet archives
have been opened up, "there is no conclusive evidence that Moscow deliberately caused the
famine in order to punish recalcitrant peasants, especially in the Ukraine, the chief victim of
the famine." H. Kuromiya, "Communism and Terror" (2001) 36 Journal of Contemporary
History 191 at 195.
164. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 50. The Commission also added 3
million victims outside the Ukraine.
165. Draper died in July 1989.
166. Sundberg erroneously stated that Levene agreed with the majority opinion. Final
Report, supra note 35, Introductory Chapter at 9.
167. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 57.
168. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. art. 2 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
169. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 61.
180 The Dalhousie Law Journal
and the Convention signed. Thus, the majority stopped short of saying
that genocide took place, because the evidence was incomplete and the
action undefended. However, they concluded that if genocide had oc-
curred it would have been contrary to the provisions of international law
then in force. 70
Oliver wrote a separate statement in which he concurred with the
majority opinion in all statements of facts, but had reservations about the
majority's concluding interpretations, with respect to both the fact of
genocide as a legal concept and its retroactivity. He was of the opinion
that intent was not present, writing to Humphrey:
Even without the 'genocide-retroactivity' problem, I am inclined to view
the famine in Ukraine as part of a USSR-wide bungle as to agricultural
policy, in which Stalin's role was probably that of a tyrant's tergiversations
as to the management of national planning, foreign exchange, industrial
development, and urban-rural relationships. His conduct may have been
'criminal', but not in a strictly Ukraine-directed way. 'Intent?'
... In the seemingly somewhat Florentine environment of our Commis-
sion, I leave to you any sharing of my highly tentative general views with
Ian and our colleagues, individually or collectively.'
He later attempted to persuade the majority to adopt a finding of crimes
against humanity rather than genocide. He wrote to Humphrey:
I'm still skittish as to our characterizing the evils in the Ukraine as legal
genocide, but I'll take without quibble '... acts against humanity, includ-
ing some today that would be called genocide.' But, not wishing to be
thought, as Bacon said of Coke, '... a mere lawyer' I'm open to counter
views.172
When Oliver was unable to dissuade his colleagues, he prepared his
Separate Statement. He was aware that his conclusion would be upsetting
to the Petitioner and wrote to Kalba to explain his view and make the
distinction between the layman's and the legal view of genocide.
As to 'genocide': I recognize that the non-professional use of the term
makes it an alternative for 'massacre, extreme cruelty and horror,' and
(more specifically) 'massive atrocity.' This is now non-legal or 'general'
genocide. But for criminality there must be a delictual norm (corpus
delicti). There is one, and it requires finding specific intent to commit,
beyond a reasonable doubt. Specific intent can be inferred from the
ordinary and normal consequences of conduct, but in the Soviet jurispru-
dence of the Purge Trials, Vishinsky, with Stalin behind the curtains in the
courtroom, enlarged specific intent to infer criminality from governmental
'mis-action' or bad results. No respectable, free world jurist could follow
where Vishinsky and Stalin had led. By coining the term 'genocide',
170. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 65.
171. Letter from Oliver to Humphrey (22 September 1989) in M04127/17/358.
172. Letter from Oliver to Humphrey (18 May 1989) in MG4127/17/357.
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Lemkin, clearly, wished a delictual norm other than 'mass atrocity' or
'crimes against humanity'; i.e., a norm making racist killings a crime of
specific intent. This is a serious but somewhat fragile innovation, and
unless the norm is protected from cheapening by making 'genocide' a
synonym for 'mass atrocity', it will be stretched beyond serious credibil-
ity, as it is right now in Romania, where, after drumhead trials and
immediate execution of the Fiendish Pair, all other trials now going on are
for 'genocide'! So by such usage, should 'genocide' be reduced to just a
synonym, or, and adjective to accentuate, 'Atrocity'?
I say 'No', and I think the Rumanianization of the term should not be
encouraged. Who started this usage of genocide, in the case of Ukraine?
Notjurists, I'll warrant, but public relations people and the ever-imprecise
press. Not Conquest, I recall.
Well, forgive, if you can. As did Martin Luther: 'Here I stand. I could not
do otherwise.' And I believe you personally must have known this.'73
Oliver sent a draft of his separate opinion to Humphrey who ruefully
noted that it "looks as if Verhoeven and I will be the only ones to accept
the latter's text."'7 4 In the final text of his statement Oliver ignored the
retroactivity question since he found:
... the Petitioner did not come to grips with two issues fundamental to the
legal crime of genocide, whatever its origins; viz.: (1) Specific criminal
intent to destroy Ukrainian ethnicity-nationality and, (2) An exclusively
Ukrainian scope of injury through central Soviet operations, Union-
wide.' 75
However, he communicated to Sundberg via Kalba that: "I should be
counted as upholding the Verhoeven draft on all points and issues save the
treatment of the legal crime of genocide."' 76 Oliver's view on the
genocide question coincided with that of the General Counsel Hunter
who, in his closing submission, stated that "the evidence does not support
a conclusion of genocide as defined in the convention."'' 77
Levasseur, in his dissenting opinion, also agreed with Hunter's view
that there was no evidence to support a conclusion of genocide. In
addition, he disagreed with the Commission majority regarding the
declarative character of the Genocide Convention and concluded it had
no retroactive application. He also agreed with the Commission on all
points of fact, asserting, however, "a qualification of the facts should
establish crimes against humanity, not genocide, against whosoever
173. Letter from Oliver to Kalba (15 February 1990) in MG4127/17/358.
174. Letter from Humphrey to Oliver (8 February 1990) in MG4127/5/64.
175. Final Report, supra note 35, Separate Statement of Professor Covey T. Oliver at 1.
176. Letter from Oliver to Kalba (3 March 1990) and letter from Kalba to Sundberg (8 March
1990) in MG4127/5/64.
177. Final Report, supra note 35, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Levasseur at 2.
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might be sent for judgment."'78 The introduction to the Final Report7 9
as well as a number of press releases stated erroneously that Levene was
a member of the majority. In fact, he wrote a lengthy separate statement
in which he not only concluded that the Genocide Convention had no
retroactive application but also declined to assign individual responsibil-
ity, as other Commissioners had done in various measure. Indeed, he felt
such assignation of responsibility beyond the mandate of the Commis-
sion. 8 On this interpretation, Humphrey wrote to Sundberg: "I have read
Levene's separate statement. Although it is much too long, often repeti-
tive and I do not agree with his conclusion, there is nothing we can do
about it."'' The variance between Levene's statement and the other
Commissioners may be attributable to the fact that he only attended the
Brussels session and had to rely on documentation for the rest. If
Humphrey felt Levene' s statement was too long, he was in for a genuine
shock when he received that of Sundberg.
Sundberg, predictably given his views in London, wrote a discursive
separate opinion that was about the same length as all the other reports
combined. 8 ' He sent the opinion with a covering letter that was some-
what critical of the circumstances under which the majority report had
been prepared. The letter read:
Please find enclosed my draft of the President's separate opinion. Once it
was discovered that the draft which had been the basis of the majority
opinion, according to the vote taken on November 18, 1989, had been
created without the author having had access to the complete documenta-
tion or even the Documentation Officer's List of Documentary Evidence
Exhibits, and in view of the absence of a collegiate discussion of basic
issues and information on references, I found it necessary to start from
scratch when drafting my opinion. I will accept Part I of the majority
opinion, setting out the history of the Commission of Inquiry, as well as its
reasoning about the number of victims. As for the rest you will find that I
follow a different road than the majority.
Petitioner is very unhappy about the delay; consequently I urge you to read
this right away and come back on the fax with the adjustments you may find
called for in your own opinions within six days. 3
178. Ibid. at 5.
179. Final Report, supra note 35, Introduction at 9.
180. Final Report, supra note 35, Separate Statement of Professor Ricardo Levene (hijo) at
20-21.
181. Letter from Humphrey to Sundberg (20 February 1990) in MG4127/5/64.
182. Final Report, supra note 35, Separate Opinion of President, Professor Jacob Sundberg.
183. Letter from Sundberg to colleagues (undated, circa early February 1990) in MG4127/
17/357.
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The Commissioners may have been somewhat unhappy about the tone of
this communication since some of the delays seemed attributable to the
recurring "Cultural Revolution" at the University of Stockholm and other
factors. Sundberg explained these delays to his colleagues as follows:
The fact that Professor Verhoeven found it difficult to identify what had
been his source of information on many specific points in the Verhoeven
Draft Opinion, when we discussed it in London, has made the checking
operation more burdensome than it might have been otherwise. The fact
that the deliberations proceeded without any agenda prepared in advance
entailed also that many important points were never addressed and
consequently have to be faced without the assistance of any collegiate
discussion in the course of work on a Separate Opinion. Regrettably this
is rather time consuming.
Furthermore, I am under new attacks at the University of Stockholm, in
fact victimized by an offensive that is a renewal of the previous one (cf
Memorandum 4, Annex 1), although the targeting has changed a little.
Setting up my defenses has consumed 10 working days and delayed my
work on the Separate Opinion correspondingly.
Unfortunately, the Secretariat in London has - for all practical purposes -
collapsed... At the present time, moreover, there is still no work plan
established for the final moves in the production and presentation of the
Final Report. As I understand our Legal Secretary in London, Mr Adrian
Jenkala, none is to be expected." 4
The above extract represents only a partial list of Sundberg's many
complaints and criticisms. The Commissioners do not appear to have
availed themselves of the opportunity to adjust their own drafts in the
light of Sundberg's Separate Opinion.
Sundberg's Separate Opinion began by stating that because he had
served on the committee that created the ILA draft statute that the
Commission took as its point of departure he felt "keenly responsible for
the procedural ideas and principles underlying the notion of an Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry." '1 Since he took a different view on
matters of procedure, he evaluated the evidence differently from his
fellow Commissioners and placed emphasis on "the paper trail" of Soviet
statutes, ordinances and decrees. 8 6 This was not an unreasonable ap-
proach, the only difficulty being that he was obliged to use translations
184. Memorandum 9 from Sundberg to the Members of the International Commission of
Inquiry (31 January 1990) in MG4127/17/355.
185. Ibid. at 1
186. Final Report, supra note 35, Introductory Chapter at 7, and Separate Opinion of
President at 11-13.
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of these Soviet papers, provided by the Petitioner or its witnesses. 8 7 In
following this trail he not only identified responsible members of the
Politburo, but also concluded that the statutory intent of the Soviet
decrees included the intent to kill.188 Sundberg, alone among all the
Comnmissioners, stated that genocide actually took place, saying "my
findings in the past are such as to coincide with what is called genocide
in the Genocide Convention."' 89 However, he could find there was no
case against any individual because all but one was by then dead' 9° and,
in any event, it was up to the Soviet Union to prosecute such cases.' 9' In
view of this, he considered the retroactivity issue to be irrelevant.
When Humphrey received Sundberg' s separate opinion, he confided to his
diary:
Sundberg has sent me a copy of his president's dissenting opinion. It
includes nearly 70 pages and is made up chiefly of quotations from
Conquest and Mace. He could have entered his dissent on half a page. He
sent me a fax in which he says that he intends to present the report to the
United Nations notwithstanding the cost involved I had already been asked
to do this.
92
187. These translations were based on the Smolensk Archive at Harvard University. When
special units of the German armed forces sacked the Smolensk archives of the Soviet
Communist Party, archivists immediately recognized the importance of this nearly complete
collection of Party records that had fallen into their hands. In early 1942 the materials were
transferred to Vilnius and later to a site near Ratibor (Racib6rz, Poland). In 1945 Soviet forces
recaptured most of the material. Some of the more important parts of this archive had, however,
been taken to Germany where they were captured by American troops. These were brought to
the United States during the Cold War for evaluation by intelligence services. Harvard scholar
Merle Fainsod analyzed the files. On the publication of his book Smolensk under Soviet Rule
in 1958, the Soviet Union insisted on the return of the records while denying the archive
contained original material, This request was ignored. Only at the end of the Cold War was the
issue of the return of the Smolensk archive raised again; however, it quickly became tangled
in broader discussions over the return of artworks and other items. See Patricia K. Grimsted,
"The Odyssey of the Smolensk Archive: Plundered Communist Records" 1999: Zeitschrift fur
Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts 12 (1997) 71; 13 (1998) 190; and 14 (1999) 134.
188. Final Report, supra note 35, Introductory Chapter at 8, and Separate Opinion of
President at 80.
189. Final Report, supra note 35, Separate Opinion of President at 87. Sundberg's exact
language is used here as it is sometimes difficult to determine precisely what he meant. In an
article on the work of the Commission, Hunter provides summaries of all the individual
opinions except Sundberg's. I.A. Hunter, "Putting History on Trial: the Ukrainian Famine of
1932-33" (1990) 15 Journal of Ukrainian Studies 47. Perhaps Hunter also had difficulty in
interpretation. Hunter published the same article under the same title with a few editorial
changes in (1992) 26 L. Soc. Gaz. 138.
190. The sole survivor was Lazar Kaganovich, who died in 1991 at age 97. See supra note 4.
191. Final Report, supra note 35, Separate Opinion of President at 87.
192. Humphrey Diary, supra note 144 (28 February 1990). In fact, Secretary-General Perez
de Cuellar was to give the second annual Humphrey Human Rights lecture later that spring, an
occasion that could have afforded a presentation of the report directly to the top.
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He communicated these views to Verhoeven, writing:
Just a note to tell you that I have read all the dissenting opinions except
Levasseur's who has been, I understand, ill. Sundberg's paper is longer
than your own and a good part of it simply quotes Conquest or Mace. He
could have entered his dissent (which is not a very powerful one) on half
a page. Our sponsors will not be too happy about the expense involved.'93
Verhoeven was evidently of a like mind, and replied:
I have also read Sundberg's statement. I must confess much perplexity.
What is the actual interest of such a long paper? As you point out, his
dissent could have entered in less than a page. For the rest, Ijust notice that
he has not found any of the alleged mistakes or failures he was looking
for... and I prefer our way of reporting to his. Surely, he is a strange man! 1
94
Copies of the Final Report were presented to the Geneva Office of the
UN 195 and to the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe. At this latter event Sundberg informed the President, Anders
Bjbrck, that:
When this idea of an inquiry was put into practice, we thoughtt] that we
would produce a sensational report on events almost unknown to the
general public. As the years went by, confessions from the Soviet side
started to come in. In the end it was found out that Gorbachov himself had
lived in the famine area - in the Ukrainian-populated Northern Caucasus
area - during the crucial years. We do not expect any longer to be
contradicted on facts. We do expect to get credit for having received and
packaged the evidence available in the West. From the East of Europe, in
fact, we expect confirmations rather than contradictions, and possibly
some corrections on the basis of materials now available in the Soviet
Union but unavailable to us when we were working.
196
The report was delivered seven years after the WCFU had started the
process and two months before Ukraine declared its sovereignty.
VII. Further Activities
Sundberg was correct in that, during the three years the Commission had
worked, events in the outside world had moved at a far faster pace.
Glasnost, with its attendant acknowledgements of the history of the Stalin
193. Letter from Humphrey to Sundberg (28 February 1990) in MG4127/5/64.
194. Letter from Verhoeven to Humphrey (undated) in MG4127/5/64. Sundberg recently
answered Verhoeven's question about the needfor such a long report, stating: "The answer is
of course that it illuminates the working of the solutions set out in the ILA's statute for an
international commission of inquiry and that was one of the reasons why I embarked upon the
enterprise." Sundberg letter, supra note 30.
195. On May 9, 1990, Sundberg had hoped to present the report to the Secretary-General, but
this had proved impossible. It was presented to Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for
Human Rights.
196. Statement from Sundberg to the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (11 May 1990) in MG4127/17/354.
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years, had come and it had gone with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, throughout this period, some of the Commissioners had won-
dered whether what they were doing was necessary. Before the first
session of the Commission Humphrey had written to Kalba, saying: "I am
beginning to think that the Russians are beginning to do the job that you
want the Commission to do."' 97 When the Soviet archives were opened
to scholars, Oliver wrote to Kalba questioning whether the time was
appropriate for a Final Report: "The Moscow announcement is most
welcome. I'd be interested in Professor H[umphrey]'s opinion as to
whether the Commission should wait for or try to publish before the
Soviet archives are opened."'98 A little earlier he had communicated his
prophetic, if dispirited, views to Humphrey, questioning the role of the
Commission:
I will be frank to tell you that my hope is that our Commission will just, as
may be said in Russian, "Pytor-out"! The Canadian and American Ukrai-
nian Groups may have reason, before long, to focus on the restructuring of
Ukrainian nationality in theUSSR, further revelations from Soviet sources,
and the difficulties that I, at least, find as to a Genocide Conviction by us.
The American and Canadian Ukrainian Groups went into this activity, as
is well-known, for striking back at the Russians. Developments may
reduce that urge.199
As it became evident that there would soon be an independent Ukraine,
the interest of the WCFU dimmed. A WCFU-sponsored conference -
New Research Findings: Famine in Ukraine 1932-33 - was held in
Toronto, and Humphrey was invited to speak about the work of the
Commission. At this meeting Humphrey after noting that he had helped
draft the Genocide Convention, articulated his view on the retroactive
application of genocide as a crime as follows:
It was, as already indicated, a propos of the crime of genocide that
controversy arose in the Commission, certain members of which were of
the opinion that no such thing as genocide existed until after the 1948
Convention came into force. If this is correct, it would mean, amongst
other things, that only these states that have ratified the convention are
bound by it. But yet, in 1946, the U.N. General Assembly had already
declared that genocide is a crime under international law. Note, moreover,
that the Convention in article 1 says that the contracting parties 'confirm'
that genocide is a crime under international law. This can only mean that,
to quote the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the convention was simply
establishing something more firmly that already existed, namely, the
crime of genocide.
197. Lettter from Humphrey to Kalba (29 April 1988) in MG4127/17/356.
198. Letter from Oliver to Kalba (15 February 1990) in MG4127/17/358.
199. Letter from Oliver to Humphrey (22 September 1989) in MG4127/17/358.
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It is true there was no convention on the subject before 1948; but
conventions are not the only sources of international law which include,
according to article 38 of the Statute of the World Court, custom and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The same
provisions were enunciated in the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
General principles of law recognized by civilized nations must certainly
have prohibited the conduct of which the Soviet Union was found by the
Commission of Inquiry to be guilty. It was a case perhaps of norms of law
existing for which there was, as yet in the thirties, no name. The elements
of the crime of genocide were there whatever it might have been called.2"e
Any plans there might have been for further publicity or litigation to
secure compensation were forgotten in the fallout of greater events. As
Humphrey told his audience at the Toronto conference:
Our report was unfortunately overtaken by events. By the time it was
published, the political scene in the Soviet Union had so changed that, with
the exception perhaps of its finding in the matter of genocide, all of its
findings had already been anticipated by Soviet public opinion and even
governmental authority. There was, it is now admitted, a famine in the
Ukraine in the thirties, it was man made and its victims included millions
of people.20 1
Humphrey seemed to be the only one interested in the issue of compen-
sation. Sundberg could recall no talk of compensation for the victims:
The declaration of Ukraine's independence took away all interest in
penetrating into the country's tragic history which was exactly what the
Final report had been doing ('putting history on trial'). The Ukrainians in
the diaspora seemed to be pouring money into the independent Ukraine,
rather than getting compensation money out of the disintegrating Soviet
Union.2 02
Verhoeven agreed, writing:
I do not know what were the intentions [regarding compensation] of the
WCFU, even if, clearly, the collapse of the Soviet Union totally modified
the perspectives, whatever they might have been for the future.
200. J.P. Humphrey, "New Research Findings: Famine in Ukraine 1932-33" (Ukrainian
Canadian Research and Documentation Centre, Toronto, 28 September 1990) in MG4127/18/
363 (Speeches, 1990-1994) [hereinafter "Toronto Speech"]. Although the Conference Pro-
gram Chairman, Wsevolod Isajiw, hadtold Humphrey that he hoped the conference proceeding
would be published (Isajiw to Humphrey (24 October 1990) in MG4127/17/355), these plans
did not come to fruition. However, Isajiw plans to have this speech published in a volume of
essays commemorating the 70th anniversary of the famine. E-mail from Isajiw to Hobbins (23
February 2001).
201. "Toronto Speech", ibid.
202. Letter from Sundberg to Hobbins (5 March 2001) at 4.
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The issue of compensation was raised by John [Humphrey] when we later
met in PEI where the summer program on human rights was organized.
John was involved at the time in a case concerning war victims. 2 3 It was
no surprise that the issue of compensation of the victims of the Ukrainian
'genocide' was incidentally evoked. But I have not heard that the point was
ever raised by the WCFU.2°
Thus, on the question of compensation, Humphrey seems to have been
entirely alone, and the matter does not appear to have been pursued.
Three years after the Commission's work was completed, Kalba wrote
to Humphrey for the last time drawing attention to Hunter's article.2 °5
Kalba termed the article an "excellent analysis made from the legal point
of view" and drew attention to the unanimous conclusions of the Com-
mission, including the fact that at least 7.5 million people died as a result
of the famine. A decade later, Hunter himself had almost doubled this
number, writing about the "man-made famine that starved to death more
than 14 million people (according to an International Commission of
Jurists which examined this tragedy in 1988-1990). "206 Kalba concluded
the letter, writing:
Also, Prof. Hunter came up with a valid proposition that this International
Commission of seven prominent international jurists, in its independent
and non-governmental status, could serve as a model to settle other
historical and contemporary controversies by judicial inquiry." 7
Thus Kalba, who had put so much effort into the Commission as a tribute
to his father, 20 8 seemed happy with the Final Report. The majority of
Commissioners did not reach the conclusion desired by the Petitioner,
that the famine was an act of genocide, nor ultimately did the Commission
203. Humphrey was actually involved in two separate endeavours in this area, seeking
compensation for the Canadian Hong Kong Veterans and the Korean Comfort Women, both
of which groups had been victims of human rights violations by the Japanese forces in the
Second World War. These actions were successfully concluded in 1998, three years after
Humphrey's death.
204. Verhoeven, supra note 22.
205. Hunter, supra note 189. This was the second publication in the Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette. Humphrey had already received an offprint of the earlier publication from
Hunter.
206. Hunter, supra note 86. The suggestion that the International Commission determined the
figure of 14 million may not be Hunter's. The parenthetical observation occurred in a Ukrainian
Canadian Civil Liberties Association reprint of the article under the title of "A tale of Truth and
Two journalists", supra note 86. It seems unlikely that Hunter would have used the confusing
phrase International Commission of Jurists and the phrase does not appear in other reprints of
the article.
207. Letter from Kalba to Humphrey (20 February 1993). Actually Hunter concluded with
the somewhat more accurate "... by quasi-judicial inquiry."
208. Kalba's father had been killed when Russian forces annexed the Polish Ukraine.
E-mail from Sundberg to Hobbins (23 April 2001).
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serve any anticipated end. However, the Commission did establish
important facts about the existence, nature, and extent of the famine.
Conclusions
The International Commission performed a number of useful functions.
It established a precedent and could, as Hunter suggested, serve as a
model for future commissions that could learn from both the strong and
weak points of the process. From a historical perspective, the Commis-
sion publicized a major catastrophe, the existence of which had been
denied for decades. Even though it was impossible for the Commission,
under the circumstances, to ascertain historical truth, it placed in the
public record much sworn and cross-examined testimony of value to the
historian.2t 9 The expert testimony that took so much of the Commission's
time is of secondary importance, since it has largely been published in the
scholarly literature. The Commission also raised important legal issues
surrounding the interpretation of customary international law, although
it failed to reach any degree of unanimity in its conclusions. It also
demonstrated to a very large degree that eminent jurists could maintain
distance and impartiality, even when empanelled by a partisan organiza-
tion for a highly political purpose.
There also appeared to be significant flaws in the process. The failure
to involve Soviet participation or hear contrary evidence goes to the heart
of questions concerning the nature of the Commission. It raises the issue
of whether the Commission was an independent fact-finding inquiry, as
implied in the Final Report, or, in Mace's words, an ersatz court of the
WCFU's own making. When first invited to join the tribunal, some
Commissioners, evidently, thought it was intended to be the former.
However, as time passed, it became more apparent that this was a forlorn
hope. Sundberg considered such hopes naYve from the very start since the
Commission was entirely dependent on the WCFU for funding and really
could hear only evidence that the Petitioner wished to present. The one
attempt to secure the testimony of a hostile witness, Tottle, was under-
taken with the apparent intent to discredit him, and even that attempt was
half-hearted. The Commission's methodology cannot, therefore, be
considered an open inquiry in search of truth, but rather a process capable
209. The Commission placed the original records, including 1,500 pages of testimony, in the
Nobel Institute of Norway. Identical sets of the archives may be found in the National Archives
of Canada (Ottawa), the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (Toronto),
the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.), the Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Harvard
University (Cambridge, MA), the Archives of Stockholm University, the Catholic University
of Louvain, the Simon Petliura Ukrainian Library (Paris), the Ukrainian Free University
(Munich), and the V. Vernadsky Central Academic Library (Kiev). WCFU news release
(September 1991) in MG4127/171359.
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of testing such evidence as was put before it. One should remember that
the Commission was not a formal legal body with any powers of
compelling testimony or ordaining punishment. It had no judicial stand-
ing. It was more of an academic body, usingjudicial procedures. A decade
later, Verhoeven, evaluating the Commission on which he served, wrote:
After all, the Commission was no more than a kind of 'tribunal
d'opinion', whose effective means to discover truth remained poor,
especially in a context where the support of the WCFU, as such challeng-
ing the independence of the commissioners, was essential. I still think
however that, by and large, the work done by the Commission is
satisfactory, at a time when the cold war excluded any cooperation with or
any assistance from the Soviet authorities. 10
The seeming confusion over the nature and role of the Commission was
only one element in the growing gulf between Sundberg, as President, and
some of the other Commissioners. It is left to the reader to determine the
extent to which Sundberg's difficulties may have hindered, delayed or
otherwise adversely affected the Commission's work. There seems no
question that the ius docendi affair distracted Sundberg, and caused both
delays and tensions in the Commission. At one point, some of the
Commissioners wondered whether Sundberg could continue as President
under the circumstances. Sundberg was to prove more resilient than
might be expected, but the situation created major problems in the
production of a report. The Commission's perceived objectivity was not
helped by the apparent predisposition of its General Counsel. In research-
ing Muggeridge's life, Hunter had in a sense already answered the
questions in the Commission's mandate concerning the existence and
extent of the famine. This would seem inconsistent for someone who was
supposed to demonstrate "complete impartiality and independence,"
especially one who was intended to counter balance the Petitioner's
counsel and give the proceedings an adversarial aspect. However, none
of the Commissioners appeared to think that this was a significant point.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, the Commissioners did not hear some
of the evidence that they had wished. Some clearly wanted to hear from
experts other than Conquest and Mace, especially those engaging in
research in the Ukraine at the time the Commission was meeting. This
was less of a concern to Sundberg who, while finding testimony contex-
tually interesting, relied on the documentary evidence presented by the
Petitioner from the Smolensk archive. Since the evidence heard was
somewhat one-sided, the Commission was certainly unwise to conclude
210. E-mail from Verhoeven to Hobbins (13 February 2001).
Seeking Historical Truth: The International Commission of Inquiry into the 191
1932-33 Famine in Ukraine
that at least 7.5 million people died as a result of the famine.21' While
history may prove the Commission correct, or even conservative, once all
the questions surrounding starvation death versus excess mortality,
reliable sources, etc. have been settled, there was clearly insufficient
evidence at the time to reach any firm conclusion. However, most of the
Commission's other unanimous conclusions seem sound.
The Commission certainly did some important work despite the
obvious flaws in the process. The Final Report was not the disaster
Humphrey had feared, despite Sundberg' s decision to remain as President.
It provided useful primary materials for historians and food for thought
for international lawyers. One reason for this success, is that it was
evident that the Commissioners were well aware of the problems, and did
what they could to minimize the potential negative effects. Whether the
International Commission could serve as a model for investigating other
historical and contemporary controversies, as Hunter suggests, is a rather
harder question to answer. Certainly, the process seems to require a
wealthy and committed petitioner, willing to undertake a significant risk.
There are also clear difficulties in establishing an independent and
credible tribunal when the cost is borne by the Petitioner. There are
perhaps less expensive, but equally credible, ways of engaging in
historical research or stimulating legal discussion. One hopes the WCFU,
which took the risk, felt the result was worth the effort in this case.
211. Final Report, supra note 35, Majority Opinion at 19-20. The Commissioners all
accepted this conclusion of at least 4.5 million victims in the Ukraine, "something which no
one disputes". This was added to an estimate of 3 million starvation deaths elsewhere in the
Soviet Union. Perhaps they should have noted that no one who gave evidence or whose work
was presented to the Commission disputed a minimum of 4.5 million. Clearly there are scholars
who disputed the figure and the Ukrainian academicians made the Commission aware of some
of their names. In this section the Commission also showed that statistical analysis, or possibly
proofreading, was not its strength. On adding 9.9% to 11.3% they stated that the Ukrainian
population declined versus Byelorussia by 20.2%. A slight computational error of 1% may
seem small, but when dealing with a population of over 30 million, it is 300,000 people.
